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SECURITIES—DEMOCRATIZING EQUITY MARKETS
WITH AND WITHOUT EXPLOITATION: ROBINHOOD,
GAMESTOP, HEDGE FUNDS, GAMIFICATION, HIGH
FREQUENCY TRADING, AND MORE
DENNIS M. KELLEHER, JASON GRIMES, & ANDRES CHOVIL*
The stock trading frenzy of January 2021 brought a relatively new
player in the securities markets into public consciousness—the
platforms offering no- or low-commission trading that seek to appeal
to young and less-experienced investors with a “fun” if not
“delightful” user experience. Most prominent among these new
brokers is Robinhood, with a slick mobile phone app, which claims
that its platform will “democratize finance” by making investing
cheaper and easier for the masses who have been looked down upon
and locked out by the wealthy elites of Wall Street.
However, Robinhood’s claims of “democratization” have all the
hallmarks of manipulation and exploitation, making Robinhood’s
founders multibillionaires while many of its retail customers suffer
financial ruin. That is because platforms like Robinhood take
arguably legal kickbacks for routing their customer orders—known as
payment for order flow—to high frequency trading firms which
execute those orders, almost always in dark, off-exchange venues. To
maximize those kickbacks, Robinhood’s mobile trading app is
gamified via predatory digital engagement practices to disarm its
customers’ financial self-defense mechanisms and prompt as much
frequent and risky trading as possible. Such trading behavior has
been shown to be highly detrimental to retail investors, and indeed
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many of Robinhood’s customers have been harmed by engaging in
such practices, some grievously. The result is that, unlike the legend
of Robin Hood stealing from the rich and giving to the poor, the
Robinhoods of the world are taking from the less experienced and
enriching themselves and their fellow Wall Street billionaires.
But it does not have to be this way. Finance can be genuinely
democratized (easier access, lower costs, user-friendly financial tools,
etc.) and trading can be demystified in ways that facilitate wealth
creation rather than wealth extraction. However, for that to happen,
regulators must enforce existing laws and rules against illegal
conduct and impose meaningful penalties on individual corporate
officers that punish and deter. Regulators must also enact new rules
to prohibit, for example, predatory digital engagement practices.
Once the highly profitable lawbreakers and predators are shut down,
the financial industry can focus on serving Main Street investors
rather than exploiting them to enrich Wall Street.

INTRODUCTION
In January 2021, the stock trading platform Robinhood Markets
(Robinhood), easily downloadable as an app to a mobile phone, burst into
the public consciousness. With it came Robinhood’s promises to
“democratize finance” and usher in a “new Wall Street” where young
Main Street denizens could make money like the privileged and wealthy
elites.1 Although Robinhood was founded eight years earlier, it received
little if any attention until it got saturation media coverage when the prices
of a small number of stocks popular on the platform fluctuated wildly for
little, if any, apparent fundamental reason. Foremost among those stocks
was GameStop, a brick-and-mortar video game retailer.
That stock price volatility was largely due to unprecedented levels of
trading by new retail investors on the Robinhood mobile phone app, many
of whom apparently were simultaneously chatting about those stocks
online in various Reddit forums, the “r/wallstreetbets” subreddit most
prominently.2 Those stocks were quickly dubbed “meme stocks.”3
The story was propelled by reporting that this new “army” of retail
investors was part of a so-called “Reddit rebellion” hellbent on inflicting
significant losses on Wall Street hedge fund billionaires whom they
1. See GAMING WALL ST (HBO Max 2022) (telling numerous stories of people using the
Robinhood app and caught up in the trading frenzy).
2. See Jake Widman, What Is Reddit, DIGITALTRENDS (July 5, 2021),
https://www.digitaltrends.com/web/what-is-reddit/ [https://perma.cc/RGP2-T28Y] (explaining
the jargon and design of Reddit, including subreddits, the names of which begin with “r/”).
3. Melanie Schaffer, The Rise and Fall of Meme Stocks, YAHOO!FINANCE (Feb. 8, 2021),
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/rise-fall-meme-stocks-153302553.html
[https://perma.cc/Y4KE-X633].
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thought were unfairly attacking certain companies and their stocks via
substantial short positions.4 Contributing to the media firestorm were
attention-grabbing phrases like “diamond hands” and “to the moon” with
associated eye-catching icons as well as a cast of colorful characters,
including “apes” and one sensation posting on r/wallstreetbets under the
username “DeepFuckingValue” and on YouTube and Twitter as “Roaring
Kitty.”
Fulfilling the always-appealing-underdog David v. Goliath storyline,
the initial narrative was that the new retail investors had bested the hedge
fund billionaires when some, Melvin Capital in particular, began suffering
significant losses as their short positions on the so-called “meme stocks”
were squeezed. The celebration was short lived, however, when
Robinhood suddenly, and without notice, prevented its new retail army of
customers from buying certain stocks, including GameStop, just as they
were reaching unimaginable, indeed stratospheric, price levels.
Robinhood’s actions had the effect of largely eliminating the buy side on
those meme stocks. That caused those stock prices to crater, allowing the
short sellers to limit their losses by covering their positions at lower,
indeed collapsing, prices. That action, however, also inflicted massive
losses on Robinhood’s retail customers who had bought the stocks at
elevated prices and were stuck holding them as they crashed. Sure, the
retail investors could sell, but doing so only accelerated the price collapse
and increased their losses. Moreover, some customers who had purchased
stocks on margin as prices skyrocketed had to then panic-sell those stocks
to meet margin calls as the prices fell precipitously.
As Robinhood started to look more like the Sherriff of Nottingham
than its legendary namesake the real Robin Hood, its claims to
democratize finance came under scrutiny. It had attracted this army of
retail traders based on marketing claims of enabling and empowering the
little guy to get rich in the stock market like the big guys, including claims
of (1) commission-free trading; (2) no minimum account balances; (3)
fractional share purchases; (4) easy access; (5) easy use; (6) a “delightful”
experience; and (7) giving people what they want (as determined by
Robinhood). As one Robinhood customer said, “I was drawn by the
promise of commission-free trades and the lack of account minimums. To
a 24-year-old—investing by the Jackson [twenty-dollar bill] rather than
by the Benjamin [hundred-dollar bill]—that was especially useful.”5
4. See Allison Morrow, Confused About This GameStop Saga? Here Are the 5 Things
You
Need
to
Know,
CNN
BUS.
(Jan.
30,
2021,
4:44
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/30/business/gamestop-reddit-rebellion-explained/index.html
[https://perma.cc/6P5T-HLWZ].
5. Mark Helenowski & Hannah Levintova, Trade More. Think Less. How Robinhood’s
Design
Gets
Inside
Your
Brain,
MOTHER
JONES
(Oct.
7,
2021),
https://www.motherjones.com/media/2021/10/robinhood-trading-app-design-ui-ux-video/
[https://perma.cc/9WUZ-RJ6A].
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However, as is often the case, the reality was much more complicated.
Robinhood’s methods to generate revenue and profits did not fit well with
the legendary do-gooder Robin Hood known for taking from the rich to
give to the poor. Rather, Robinhood employed a suspect business model
that depended upon its customers trading more and more so that it could
sell those orders to high frequency trading (HFT) firms like Citadel
Securities. This payment scheme is known as “payment for order flow”
(PFOF), which looks a lot like kickbacks or legalized bribery with all the
attendant perverse incentives and conflicts of interest. It turns out that
Robinhood was essentially working with the rich to make themselves rich,
not taking from the rich.6
Robinhood and others claim that PFOF is beneficial to its customers
because it ostensibly enables “commission-free trading” (which, not
coincidentally, is heard by many as “free trading”).7 That “evoke[s] a key
lesson of the digital age: If something is free, then you’re not the
customer—you’re the product being sold.”8 In this case, sold to HFT
firms like Citadel Securities. That business model made billionaires of
Robinhood’s founders and enriched the billionaire owners of HFT firms
like Citadel Securities’ Ken Griffin. The rich got richer and the losses for
Robinhood’s customers grew,9 a scenario that calls to mind Fred Schwed’s
6. These can be dry, complicated issues—especially payment for order flow—but they
have nonetheless been the subject of two recent shows that present them in understandable and
informative, if not entertaining, ways. One is the HBO Max documentary referred to in note 1
above. The other is a recent episode of The Problem with Jon Stewart. See The Problem with
Jon Stewart: Stock Market (Apple TV+ Mar. 3, 2022). See also SPENCER JAKAB, THE
REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T: GAMESTOP, REDDIT, AND THE FLEECING OF SMALL INVESTORS
(2022) (a book-length examination of how online brokers that claim to democratize finance
actually benefit Wall Street at the expense of retail investors).
7. See infra Section III.B.
8. Hannah Levintova, Robinhood Promises Free Trades. Did Alex Kearns Pay with His
Life?,
MOTHER
JONES
(Apr.
29,
2021),
https://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2021/04/robinhood-gamestop-free-trades-alex-kearns/
[https://perma.cc/G3XM9NJ9].
9. Whether ironic or tragic, it is worth noting that many of Robinhood’s customers
believed (as clearly if vulgarly expressed in the r/wallstreetbets forum) that their actions were
going to stick it to Wall Street’s billionaires. They did inflict billions in losses on at least one
billionaire, Gabe Plotkin, the owner of Melvin Capital, but every trade they made to implement
that desire not only enriched billionaires like Ken Griffin at Citadel Securities but made
billionaires out of Robinhood’s founders and will even likely make billionaires out of the owners
and investors in Reddit. See Michael Hytha & Priya Anand, Reddit Files for IPO After Igniting
the Year’s Meme Stock Frenzy, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2021, 11:09 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-16/media-platform-reddit-says-it-filedconfidentially-for-u-s-ipo?sref=mQvUqJZj [https://perma.cc/99AH-S6QB]. Reddit reacted
predictably. Kai Schultz, WallStreetBets Jokes of Pumping Reddit Stock After IPO Filing,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 16, 2021, 12:40 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-1216/wallstreetbets-jokes-of-pumping-reddit-stock-after-ipofiling?srnd=premium&sref=mQvUqJZj [https://perma.cc/83V5-YCR5] (“[T]he pile-ons were
plentiful, the profanity more so . . . .”).
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classic 1955 book, Where Are the Customers’ Yachts? Or A Good Hard
Look at Wall Street.10
To further complicate the story, Ken Griffin’s Citadel Securities was
paying Robinhood for more than half of its customers’ order flow11 while
funds in Griffin’s $43 billion hedge fund,12 Citadel LLC, and the firm’s
partners (believed to include Griffin himself) invested $2 billion in Melvin
Capital, the leading hedge fund that had shorted GameStop and other
meme stocks during the January 2021 trading frenzy.13 This emergency
injection of funds (along with investments from others) enabled Melvin
Capital to cover its short position and limit its losses at the same time at
least some of Robinhood’s retail customers were taking significant
losses.14
Even before these events, many of Robinhood’s business practices
had already come under intense regulatory scrutiny. For example, in
2020, the company settled with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) for $65 million.15 In 2021, the company settled with the Financial
10. See generally FRED SCHWED, JR., WHERE ARE THE CUSTOMERS’ YACHTS? OR A
GOOD HARD LOOK AT WALL STREET (1955) (explaining how stockbrokers get filthy rich even
when their clients go broke following their advice).
11. Douglas MacMillan & Yeganeh Torbati, Robinhood and Citadel’s Relationship
Comes into Focus as Washington Vows to Examine Stock-Market Moves, WASH. POST (Jan. 29,
2021, 5:49 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/01/29/robinhood-citadelgamestop-reddit/ [https://perma.cc/THH9-3WP6].
12. Katherine Burton & Nishant Kumar, Millennium, Citadel Winning the War to Keep
Client
Cash
Longer,
BLOOMBERG
(Dec.
6,
2021,
10:16
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-06/millennium-citadel-winning-the-warto-keep-client-cash-longer?srnd=premium&sref=mQvUqJZj [https://perma.cc/8ZWV-7THD].
13. Katherine Burton, Citadel, Point72 Back Melvin with $2.75 Billion After Losses,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 25, 2021, 5:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-0125/citadel-point72-to-invest-275-billion-in-melvin-capital?sref=mQvUqJZj
[https://perma.cc/AF3C-3N9S]; see also Juliet Chung, Hedge Fund Melvin Lost $6.8 Billion in
a Month. Winning It Back Is Taking a Lot Longer, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2022, 9:51 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/melvin-plotkin-gamestop-losses-memestock-11643381321
[https://perma.cc/25XY-JSH4]. Citadel has reportedly reduced its investment in Melvin by half.
Juliet Chung & Susan Pulliam, Citadel Is Further Paring Back $2 Billion Melvin Investment,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2022, 8:51 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/citadel-is-further-paringback-2-billion-melvin-investment-11645710666 [https://perma.cc/29PR-6WHW]. Point72 has
also redeemed $750 million of its investment from Melvin Capital. Hema Parmer, Steve
Cohen’s Point72 to Redeem $750 Million From Hedge Fund Melvin, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 12,
2022, 11:51 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-12/cohen-s-point72-toredeem-750-million-from-hedge-fund-melvin?sref=mtQ4hc2k
[https://perma.cc/2QB8D3EB].
14. Adding insult to injury, not only were losses inflicted on Robinhood’s retail
customers due to the price collapse precipitated by its buying halt (causing more than $30 billion
in market cap losses by February 9, 2021), but Robinhood also made money on every sell trade
a customer made to cut their losses as the prices dropped or to cover margin calls.
15. Robinhood Fin., LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10906, Exchange Act Release No.
90694, at 7 (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2020/33-10906.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B7UV-4NW4] (noting that Robinhood had “unusually high [PFOF] rates”).
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Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) for a record-breaking $70
million.16 The more recent events have precipitated numerous additional
legal actions against Robinhood, including yet more investigations by the
SEC and FINRA as well as a lawsuit by the Massachusetts secretary of
state and several class actions.17
Nor do the events of January 2021 reflect all of the questionable
business practices, tactics, and actions of Robinhood and other similar
trading platforms. For example, how did Robinhood get this new army of
retail customers to trade so frequently, including often with high-risk
products like options—which were extremely lucrative for Robinhood to
sell to the likes of Citadel Securities? In addition to Robinhood’s
democratizing and marketing claims listed above, the answer lies in how
Robinhood designed its platform. While some have coined the term
“gamification” to refer to the various features created and used to attract
and keep customers on the app and frequently trading, the SEC,
appropriately, refers to these features using the broader term “digital
engagement practices,” or DEPs.18
DEPs can be neutral or even beneficial. However, in the case of
Robinhood and similar trading platforms, they can also be intensely
predatory with devastating—and sometimes lethal—results.19 Like the
bright lights and design of the casinos in Las Vegas, there is reason to
believe that Robinhood carefully designed, calibrated, and tailored its
DEPs to get its customers’ dopamine and endorphins flowing, to disarm
their self-defense mechanisms, and to subliminally prompt them to engage

16. See FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE,
WAIVER, AND CONSENT NO. 2020066971201 (2021) [hereinafter FINRA LETTER],
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/robinhood-financial-awc-063021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N3SN-GF3E] (noting the imposition of sanctions, including a $57 million fine
and $13 million in restitution).
17. Megan Leonhardt, Robinhood Now Faces Roughly 50 Lawsuits After GameStop
Trading Halt—Here’s How Customers Might Actually Get Their Day in Court, CNBC MAKE IT
(Aug. 31, 2021, 12:17 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/17/robinhood-faces-lawsuits-aftergamestop-trading-halt.html [https://perma.cc/M374-TDUF]; Administrative Complaint,
Robinhood Financial, LLC, No. E-2020-0047 (Mass. Off. of Sec’y State, Sec. Div. Dec. 16,
2020) [hereinafter Administrative Complaint]. Robinhood sued the Massachusetts Secretary of
State seeking to stop the administrative action and a Massachusetts Superior Court declared that
the Secretary of State’s fiduciary duty rule, which the administrative complaint alleges
Robinhood violated, exceeded the Secretary’s authority and is, accordingly, invalid. Robinhood
Fin., LLC v. Galvin, Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 75,345 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 30, 2022),
https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/legaldocs/dwvkrqkbzpm/03302022robinhood.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4L7Z-JKXH].
18. Request for Information and Comments on Broker-Dealer and Investment Adviser
Digital Engagement Practices, Related Tools and Methods, and Regulatory Considerations and
Potential Approaches; Information and Comments on Investment Adviser Use of Technology
to Develop and Provide Investment Advice, 86 Fed. Reg. 49,067 (Sept. 1, 2021).
19. See infra Section III.E.
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in thoughtless, frequent trading.20 This is particularly true among
Robinhood’s targeted audience of young, new, and less-experienced
traders. The result is that Robinhood extracts multiples more in value
from each of its customers than any other retail trading firm.21
Viewed in this light, Robinhood’s claims of “democratization”
appear to be, at least in part, manipulation and exploitation, from its name,
hat, and feather logo to its ticker symbol HOOD. Enriching HFT and
hedge fund billionaires,22 while making the founders of Robinhood
themselves billionaires from the trading of its customers, would seem to
be inconsistent not only with the Robin Hood legend, but also with
Robinhood’s marketing, claims, and, often, disclosures (at least according
to the SEC’s allegations). That is why criticism has rained down on
Robinhood, including from famed investor and Warren Buffet partner
Charlie Munger who said that Robinhood is “a gambling parlor
masquerading as a respectable business.”23
As practiced by the Robinhoods of the world, democratizing finance
appears to be a veil used to hide and disguise a panoply of exploitative,
wealth-extraction features. While they may indeed provide greater and
easier access to the markets, they are apparently designed to do so in a
manner that makes the customers easy marks to be taken advantage of by
sophisticated financial professionals like the founders, owners, and
business associates of Robinhood. This results in a massive transfer of
wealth from the new, less-experienced traders to the sophisticated and
already rich financial professionals. Thus, Robinhood appears to have
more of the trappings of the Sheriff of Nottingham than its namesake.
It does not have to be this way. Finance can and should be genuinely
democratized. More people, including those who are young, less
experienced, and less wealthy, should be able to participate and invest in

20. See, e.g., Mother Jones, Robinhood’s Design Won Awards. Now, It’s the Problem,
YOUTUBE
(Oct.
7,
2021),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=
7HKZFGdSOhs&t=1s [https://perma.cc/XN5E-HBUV]; Helenowski & Levintova, supra note
5.
21. Tomio Geron, Data Shows How Robinhood Makes More Money from Its Users Than
Other Brokers, PROTOCOL (July 15, 2021), https://www.protocol.com/fintech/payment-fororder-flow [https://perma.cc/EBM5-7FK4].
22. It is interesting, if not telling, that Robinhood’s cofounders built HFT trading
platforms for Wall Street firms prior to founding Robinhood. Jeff Kauflin & Antoine Gara, The
Inside Story of Robinhood’s Billionaire Founders, Option Kid Cowboys and the Wall Street
Sharks
That
Feed
on
Them,
FORBES
(Aug.
19,
2020,
6:30
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffkauflin/2020/08/19/the-inside-story-of-robinhoodsbillionaire-founders-option-kid-cowboys-and-the-wall-street-sharks-that-feed-onthem/?sh=6e8f4c34268d [https://perma.cc/PKF8-ASLH].
23. Nicolas Vega, Charlie Munger Calls Robinhood ‘A Gambling Parlor’—Here’s How
Warren Buffet Says to Invest Instead, CNBC MAKE IT (June 30, 2021, 4:54 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/30/charlie-munger-warren-buffett-dont-stock-pick.html
[https://perma.cc/U6NL-S9S4].
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the stock market and accumulate wealth. That would be good not only for
them, but also for capital formation, price discovery, the economy, and,
ultimately, the country. That democratization could include lower costs,
ease of access and use, and even a “delightful” experience. It could even
include the use of DEPs, but those employed in a way that properly
informs investors about risks and costs of different types of investing and
trading, not those that are full of tricks and traps that invisibly exploit
Main Street customers and extract their wealth to enrich others. While
undoubtedly this would be less lucrative for trading platforms (at least in
the short term), it could nonetheless be an important part of a wealthcreation system for the many rather than a wealth-extraction mechanism
for the few.24
In Part I of this Article, we review in more detail the GameStop and
meme stock trading frenzy in the winter of 2021 and the rise of Robinhood
and other trading platforms. In Part II, we explore the practice of PFOF,
some of the controversies surrounding the conflicts it introduces for
brokers, and its impact on markets and explain how lucrative PFOF
payments have enabled the recent rise of trading platforms like Robinhood
that use DEPs to maximize their PFOF revenue. In Part III, we look at the
trading platforms themselves, especially Robinhood, and how their
predatory use of PFOF-fueled DEPs induces customers to engage in
behavior that is lucrative for the platforms but detrimental, if not ruinous,
for the customers. Finally, in Part IV, we explore some of the options
available to the SEC to address the investor protection concerns raised by
PFOF and DEPs, which, done right, could reduce the exploitation while
enabling genuine democratization of finance and access to the stock
market.
I. GAMESTOP AND THE MEME STOCK FRENZY OF WINTER 2021
At the beginning of 2020, the stock of GameStop, a publicly traded
company listed on the New York Stock Exchange, was trading around six

24. See, e.g., Sayan Chaudhry & Chinmay Kulkarni, Design Patterns of Investing Apps
and Their Effects on Investing Behaviors, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2021 ACM DESIGNING
INTERACTIVE SYSTEMS CONFERENCE: JUNE 28–JULY 2, 2021, NOWHERE AND EVERYWHERE
777,
784
(2021),
https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3461778.3462008
[https://perma.cc/CV8C-YY5X] (identifying a set of “best practices” to apply when designing
a trading platform that would encourage more deliberative and less impulsive trading).
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dollars a share.25 By April 2020, it was as low as three dollars a share.26
That low share price appeared to reflect the condition, competition, and
prospects for the struggling video game retailer. Like other brick-andmortar retailers, it has to compete with the likes of Amazon, which offers
consumers the ability to purchase almost any product without leaving their
couch. Even worse for GameStop, consumers of games, or “gamers,” no
longer need to purchase physical copies of games. Instead, they can
simply download games directly to their console, eliminating much of the
reason for anyone to go to a brick-and-mortar store like GameStop.27
These factors and others had led to several consecutive years of declining
revenues and increasing losses.28 And, most of that was before the
economic shock and lockdowns caused by the COVID-19 pandemic,
which hit physical retailers like GameStop hard, making its previous
problems much worse.
Despite these facts and the fundamental analysis that flows from
them, GameStop’s share price experienced an increased volume of
trading, increased volatility, and, overall, an increase in share price over
the remaining months of 2020.29 Some of this may have been driven by
news directly relevant to GameStop (including an August investment by
a founder which coincided with an approximately twenty-four percent
increase in share price). However, some of that buying interest seems to
have been driven by increasing attention from retail traders in online chat
forums like r/wallstreetbets, a subreddit on the website Reddit, which,
25. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF REPORT ON EQUITY AND OPTIONS MARKET
STRUCTURE CONDITIONS IN EARLY 2021 at 17 (2021), https://www.sec.gov/files/staff-reportequity-options-market-struction-conditions-early-2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D43P-F2UT]
[hereinafter SEC STAFF GAMESTOP REPORT]. It is important to note that some academics (who
identified additional material data) have raised very serious questions about the analysis and
conclusions in this report, in particular the conclusion that the dramatic appreciation in the price
of meme stocks was not the result of a short squeeze or gamma squeeze. See AD HOC ACAD.
COMM., A REPORT BY THE AD HOC ACADEMIC COMMITTEE ON EQUITY AND OPTIONS
MARKET
STRUCTURE
CONDITIONS
IN
EARLY
2021
(2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4030179 [https://perma.cc/7K42-8HVJ];
see also Joshua Mitts et al., An Academic Critique of the SEC’s GameStop Report, CLS BLUE
SKY BLOG (Feb. 22, 2022), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2022/02/22/an-academiccritique-of-the-secs-gamestop-report/ [https://perma.cc/Y924-4NQR].
However, those
academics do not appear to question the SEC’s recitation of the facts related to the meme stock
frenzy and, therefore, we cite the report for those facts, not the analysis or conclusions.
26. Id.
27. While it is not over yet, this story is similar to the stories where people had to rent
movies on tape to play in their VCRs, all of which was entirely eliminated first by Netflix
mailing direct to your home and later by streaming and other online video delivery platforms.
See Frank Olito, The Rise and Fall of Blockbuster, INSIDER (Aug. 20, 2020, 3:30 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/rise-and-fall-of-blockbuster [https://perma.cc/P5Q5-XDJP].
28. See GameStop Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 23, 2021),
https://gamestop.gcs-web.com/static-files/55a92a3e-144e-4d2b-8ee6-930db9045593
[https://perma.cc/T2BA-L2H5].
29. SEC STAFF GAMESTOP REPORT, supra note 25, at 17.
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among other things, provides myriad discussion forums.30 A number of
those traders noted that GameStop had a short interest ratio of eighty-four
percent in April 2020.31 Ultimately, on December 31, 2020, GameStop
stock closed at $18.84 a share, up significantly from its three-dollar low
in April. However, even this largely inexplicable price increase could not
foreshadow what would happen next for GameStop.
Over the course of the first few weeks of 2021, the price of GameStop
stock skyrocketed notwithstanding the absence of any fundamental
change in GameStop’s business or public disclosures. An SEC staff report
on the market turmoil straightforwardly describes the extraordinary price
rise and volatility experienced by GameStop during this period:
GME’s price and volume began to increase noticeably on January 13,
when the closing price rose to $31.40 from $19.95 the prior day, and
the share volume rose to approximately 144 million shares, compared
with approximately 7 million shares the day before. On January 22,
2021, the price of GME rose from $43 to $72 (a 71% increase) in
approximately three hours. By January 27, GME closed at a high of
$347.51 per share, representing a more than 1,600% increase from its
closing price on January 11. The following day, share prices jumped
further to an intraday high of $483.00. As the price increased, so too
did the trading volume. From January 13–29, an average of
approximately 100 million GME shares traded per day, an increase of
over 1,400% from the 2020 average. On January 22, 2021, the day of
GME’s highest share volume in the month, 197.2 million GME shares
traded.
Overall, GME’s intraday share price increased approximately
2,700% from its intraday low on January 8 to its intraday high on
January 28, followed by a decrease of over 86% from that day to the
closing price at the end of the first week of February. The daily
closing price changes at the end of January were also highly volatile
in dollar terms, ranging from a rise of $199.53 (between January 26
and 27) to a fall of $153.91 (between January 27 and January 28).32

Suffice it to say, the business prospects of GameStop did not suddenly
improve by 1,600% over the course of a couple of weeks. Instead,
GameStop had become a meme stock—typically, a low-value stock
viewed skeptically by financial analysts at Wall Street’s biggest banks,
hedge funds, and elsewhere, and often heavily shorted, that customers of
30. See
Staff,
Reddit
Recap
2021,
UPVOTED
(Dec.
8,
2021),
https://www.redditinc.com/blog/reddit-recap-2021 [https://perma.cc/3VBB-9QKZ] (noting
three posts on the r/wallstreetbets subreddit related to GameStop are among the five most
upvoted posts of the year).
31. SEC STAFF GAMESTOP REPORT, supra note 25, at 18.
32. Id. at 18–19.

KELLEHER, GRIMES, & CHOVIL(DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

DEMOCRATIZING EQUITY MARKETS

5/18/22 4:36 PM

61

online forums such as Reddit’s r/wallstreetbets rally around, often to
trigger a short squeeze.33
In fact, GameStop, often referred to as “the poster child for the meme
stock movement,”34 was only the most prominent of the meme stocks.
Several other stocks targeted by online trading communities also
experienced significant price increases amidst heightened trading volume
and increased volatility in January 2021. For example, AMC, a
beleaguered movie chain battered by pandemic lockdowns, saw its price
increase nearly tenfold, from $2.27 at the end of 2020 to $20.36 on
January 27, 2021; BlackBerry, makers of the once-ubiquitous smart
phones that were popular with (and seen as a symbol of) the on-the-go
professional set in the 2000s, but whose products had been surpassed by
Apple’s iPhone and Samsung’s Galaxy, among others, saw its share price
nevertheless more than quadruple from $6.63 at the end of 2020 to $28.77
on January 27, 2021; the share price of headphone manufacturer Koss,
Corp., which struggled to compete with the likes of Apple and Bose, and
which saw a sixteen percent decline in revenue in 2020, rose from $3.44
a share at the end of 2020 to $112.84 a share on January 28, 2021—an
even more pronounced percentage increase than GameStop’s meteoric
rise over the same period.35
The volatility around GameStop and other meme stocks, largely
divorced from business fundamentals or material market information, put
a significant amount of stress on markets and market participants. The
most prominent example was how the rapid increase in the share prices of
struggling companies put pressure on short sellers. This included in
particular the Melvin Capital hedge fund, which had a significant short
interest in GameStop and which, accordingly, was racking up huge losses
as the stock price climbed (ultimately leading to an emergency investment
of more than $2.75 billion from hedge funds Citadel LLC and Point72, to
prevent Melvin Capital from going bankrupt).36
33. See Schaffer, supra note 3.
34. Molly Schuetz, GameStop Reports Wider Loss Amid Lack of News on Strategy,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 8, 2021, 5:51 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-1208/gamestop-reports-wider-loss-as-investors-await-news-on-strategy?sref=mQvUqJZj
[https://perma.cc/G5KS-CZS6].
35. Taylor Tepper, The Rise and Fall of the GameStop Meme Stocks, FORBES ADVISOR
(Feb. 4, 2021, 3:47 PM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/investing/gamestop-meme-stocksbb-amc-nok/ [https://perma.cc/8YEF-5294].
36. Juliet Chung, Citadel, Point72 to Invest $2.75 Billion into Melvin Capital
Management, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2021, 3:49 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/citadelpoint72-to-invest-2-75-billion-into-melvin-capital-management11611604340?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/VLK7-VFLJ]. It was Citadel’s hedge fund
business that made the investment in Melvin Capital. See MacMillan & Torbati, supra note 11.
Citadel also separately operates a market-maker and high-frequency trading business under the
name Citadel Securities which, as explained below, is one of the biggest purchasers of order
flow from Robinhood. See id.
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Moreover, as market volatility increased, some broker-dealers had
trouble meeting their financial commitments to clearinghouses, ostensibly
spurring them to restrict buy-side trading in GameStop and other meme
stocks. Among other things, this broker buying halt gave “hedge funds
[like Melvin Capital] who’d bet on its decline [i.e., shorted the stock]
valuable time to recover.”37
Most infamously, Robinhood, the highly popular trading platform for
retail investors, on which many shares of GameStop were being traded
during the frenzy, suddenly halted the ability of its clients to buy
GameStop and certain of the other meme stocks on January 28, 2021.38
Those restrictions were not fully lifted by Robinhood until February 5,
2021.39
These buying halts by Robinhood and others effectively created a
one-sided market where the demand-side from buy orders largely
disappeared, resulting in a price collapse from a flood of sell orders. That
market reaction had a severe adverse impact on many investors—
GameStop closed at $193.60 on January 28, 2021, down from its close at
$347.51 the previous day, and down even further from its intraday high
that day of $483.40 According to lawsuits filed in response to the trading
halt, the price drop was a direct result of the buying halt because it
triggered a sell-off that caused the share price of GameStop and other
meme stocks to plummet. This left many investors who had bought stock
as the price was going up selling into a suddenly declining market,
resulting in significant losses for retail investors who had “to choose
between selling the [stocks subject to Robinhood’s buying halt] at a lower
price or holding their rapidly declining positions in the [stocks subject to
Robinhood’s buying halt].”41 Indeed, by February 4, 2021, GameStop’s
37. Levintova, supra note 8.
38. Leonhardt, supra note 17. Robinhood cited several reasons for its restriction on
buying GameStop and other meme stocks, including the need to deposit hundreds of millions
of dollars with clearinghouses because of the extreme market volatility. What Happened This
Week, ROBINHOOD (Jan. 29, 2021), https://blog.robinhood.com/news/2021/1/29/whathappened-this-week [https://perma.cc/P9ZX-4J7N].
39. Adam Gabbatt, Robinhood Lifts All Trading Restrictions Including GameStop and
AMC Shares, GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/feb/05/
robinhood-lifts-trading-restrictions-gamestop-amc-shares [https://perma.cc/W9PK-VA95].
40. See SEC STAFF GAMESTOP REPORT, supra note 25, at 18–19; Yun Li & Jesse Pound,
GameStop’s Stock Closes Down More than 40% After Brokers Place Restrictions on Trades,
CNBC (Jan. 28, 2021, 4:16 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/28/gamestop-reverses-lossesand-surges-another-30percent-in-the-premarket-to-450-as-mania-continues.html
[https://perma.cc/6DHK-ZWRR].
41. Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 5, In re January 2021 Short Squeeze Trading
Litigation, No. 21-2989-mdl-altonga (S.D. Fla. July 27, 2021); see also Leonhardt, supra note
17; SEC STAFF GAMESTOP REPORT, supra note 25, at 18. Many suspected something nefarious
in the Robinhood trading halt. As discussed below, Robinhood makes its money by selling its
customer orders to market makers and high-frequency traders (HFTs), a practice known as
PFOF. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. For example, Citadel Securities (an HFT)
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stock had slid to $53.50, imposing “heavy losses” on retail investors.42
As a result, as of February 9, 2021, less than two weeks from its peak,
GameStop had lost more than $30 billion in market capitalization,43 an
indication of the potential magnitude of losses suffered by retail investors
who bought in during the frenzy.44
Nonetheless, there are some who saw the unprecedented turmoil that
rocked the market in January 2021 as essentially no big deal or,
alternatively, as evidence of the strength of the U.S. securities markets.45
However, to their credit, important policymakers saw through this and
have treated the meme stock trading frenzy as an indicator of market abuse
and potentially systemic concern, both on its own merits and for what it
has demonstrated about the fragility and susceptibility to manipulation of
pays Robinhood, and other brokers, a significant amount of money for their retail order flow.
MacMillan & Torbati, supra note 11. Given that just a few days earlier, Citadel had participated
in a multi-billion-dollar bailout of Melvin Capital, which was facing staggering losses as a result
of its short interest in GameStop and other meme stocks, many speculated that Robinhood’s
trading halt was the result of Robinhood bowing to pressure from one of its biggest and most
important revenue providers. Id. However, all involved have denied any connection, and no
evidence has emerged publicly to support the claims that Robinhood halted trading for reasons
other than for financial and risk management, although it did initially provide other reasons for
the halt. Jeff Kearns & Hema Parmar, Robinhood, Citadel Reject Conspiracy Claims That They
Halted
‘Meme’
Trades,
L.A.
TIMES
(Feb.
17,
2021,
5:08
PM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story/2021-02-17/robinhood-citadel-rejectconspiracy-claims-they-halted-meme-trades [https://perma.cc/2SAR-JC7K].
42. See Drew Harwell, As GameStop Stock Crumbles, Newbie Traders Reckon With
Heavy
Losses,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
2,
2021,
5:34
PM),
https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/02/02/gamestop-stock-plunge-losers/
[https://perma.cc/F3SD-RR8E]; Daniel Raddenbach, RobinHood’s Goal Is Not to ‘Democratize
Finance for All’: Don’t Expect GameStop Buyers’ Lawsuits to Change That, MINN. L. REV.
BLOG (Apr. 13, 2021), https://minnesotalawreview.org/2021/04/13/robinhoods-goal-is-not-todemocratize-finance-for-all-dont-expect-gamestop-buyers-lawsuits-to-changethat/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=robinhoods-goal-is-not-todemocratize-finance-for-all-dont-expect-gamestop-buyers-lawsuits-to-change-that
[https://perma.cc/B2CG-635X].
43. Bailey Lipschultz, GameStop Extends Drop, Erases $30 Billion in Value From Peak,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 9, 2021, 11:19 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-0209/gamestop-selloff-deepens-erasing-30-billion-in-value-from-peak?sref=mtQ4hc2k
[https://perma.cc/9ZM2-LCRT].
44. It is worth noting that volatility and shareholder losses have continued long after the
January 2021 trading frenzy. See, e.g., Alexander Osipovich, GameStop, AMC Share Prices
Fall in Blow to Meme-Stock Investors, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2021) [hereinafter AMC Share
Prices
Fall],
https://www.wsj.com/articles/gamestop-and-amc-stocks-fall-in-blow-tomemestock-investors-11639422003 [https://perma.cc/J4DX-YGGJ].
45. See Game Stopped? Who Wins and Loses When Short Sellers, Social Media, and
Retail Investors Collide: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 117th Cong. 1 (2021),
https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-117-ba00-wstate-blaugrundm20210317.pdf [https://perma.cc/PQH6-HKH3] (testimony of Michael Blaugrand, Chief
Operating Officer of the New York Stock Exchange) (“At each of these times of stress, market
participants have been able to depend on NYSE’s infrastructure and well-established volatility
controls. In short, the markets worked.”).
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the U.S. capital markets.
For example, under the leadership of Chairwoman Maxine Waters
(D-CA), the House Committee on Financial Services held a series of three
hearings to examine market volatility.46 Over the course of the hearings,
the House Financial Services Committee heard from Vlad Tenev, the CEO
of Robinhood, Kenneth C. Griffin, the CEO of both Citadel LLC, the
hedge fund, and Citadel Securities, the HFT, Gary Gensler, the Chairman
of the SEC, prominent academics, representatives of public interest
groups (including one of the authors of this Article47), and others. For its
part, the SEC staff undertook a review of the incident, culminating in a
staff report released on October 14, 2021.48
The GameStop saga also came at a fateful time for trading platforms,
especially Robinhood. Robinhood has experienced explosive growth
since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.49 That growth has been
accompanied by increased regulatory scrutiny, which has resulted (so
far50) in, first, a December 2020 settled enforcement action with the SEC
involving allegations that Robinhood made material misrepresentations
and omissions to its customers about its execution quality and order

46. See Game Stopped? Who Wins When Short Sellers, Social Media, and Retail
Investors Collide: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 117th Cong. (2021),
https://financialservices.house.gov/events/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=407107
[https://perma.cc/MM7V-GEEU]; Game Stopped? Who Wins When Short Sellers, Social
Media, and Retail Investors Collide, Part II: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 117th
Cong. (2021), https://financialservices.house.gov/events/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=406268
[https://perma.cc/3GVB-9SV6]; Game Stopped? Who Wins When Short Sellers, Social Media,
and Retail Investors Collide, Part III: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 117th Cong.
(2021), https://financialservices.house.gov/events/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=407748
[https://perma.cc/EYH5-4QX2].
47. For Dennis M. Kelleher’s full written testimony, see Game Stopped? Who Wins and
Loses When Short Sellers, Social Media, and Retail Investors Collide, Part II: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 117th Cong. (2021) [hereinafter Kelleher Testimony],
https://bettermarkets.org/sites/default/files/Kelleher%20HFSC%20Testimony%20GameStop
%20Hearing%203-17-2021%20FINAL%20%282%29.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J3VM-X7FT]
(testimony of Dennis M. Kelleher). For a written copy of Kelleher’s opening statement, see
Game Stopped? Who Wins and Loses When Short Sellers, Social Media, and Retail Investors
Collide, Part II: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 117th Cong. (2021),
https://bettermarkets.org/sites/default/files/Testimony%20HFSC%20GameStop%20Opening
%20Stmt%203-17-2021_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJP8-AT9T] (opening statement of Dennis M.
Kelleher). A video of Kelleher’s testimony is also available. See Better Markets, Key Moments:
Dennis Kelleher Testifies at the HFSC’s Part II of the GameStop Hearing, YOUTUBE (Mar. 18,
2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=chogYSWCA24 [https://perma.cc/3BQ5-PF5W].
48. See SEC STAFF GAMESTOP REPORT, supra note 25.
49. Annie Massa & Sara Ponczek, Robinhood’s Addictive App Made Trading a Pandemic
Pastime,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(Oct.
22,
2020,
4:12
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-10-22/how-robinhood-s-addictive-appmade-trading-a-covid-pandemic-pastime [https://perma.cc/EU7X-BPW9].
50. There are still a number of investigations ongoing. See, e.g., Schuetz, supra note 34
(“GameStop said it received a subpoena in August from the [SEC] . . . .”).
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routing practices, resulting in a $65 million fine.51 Second, an
administrative lawsuit filed in April 2021 by the Massachusetts secretary
of state, alleging that Robinhood engages in a number of harmful and
illegal practices, and seeking to bar it from operating in Massachusetts.52
And finally, a settled June 2021 enforcement action for a record-breaking
amount of $70 million with the FINRA, involving allegations of serious
deficiencies that caused “widespread and significant harm” to its
customers.53
The investigations and actions against Robinhood and into the
GameStop frenzy have confirmed that there are serious weaknesses and
deficiencies in the structure and regulation of the U.S. capital markets.54
Many of these are decades old, while others have arisen more recently,
spurred by technological and other changes. Whatever their origin or
nature, these weaknesses and deficiencies pose enormous risks, both to
retail investors and to the market as a whole. For example, as the Federal
Reserve explained in its November 2021 Financial Stability Report, the
meme stock episode of January 2021, while it “did not leave a lasting
imprint,” may portend “[a] potentially destabilizing outcome” in regard to
the stability of the financial system.55
Old market problems and new threats have intersected with the rise
of low- or no-commission trading platforms, most prominently
Robinhood, and the use of so-called gamification features and other
DEPs.56 DEPs, which are common features in many non-financial apps,
51. Robinhood Fin., LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10906, Exchange Act Release No.
90694, at 7 (Dec. 17, 2020) (noting that Robinhood had “unusually high [PFOF] rates”).
52. Administrative Complaint, supra note 17.
53. FINRA LETTER, supra note 16 (noting the imposition of sanctions, including a $57
million fine and $13 million in restitution).
54. For a brief overview of some of the many market structure issues present in the U.S.
securities markets, and our perspective on them, see Better Markets’ Market Structure Advocacy
Through
the
Years,
BETTER
MARKETS
BLOG
(Mar.
15,
2021),
https://bettermarkets.org/newsroom/better-markets-market-structure-advocacy-through-years/
[https://perma.cc/FR4B-DDW4].
55. FED.
RSRV.
FIN.
STABILITY
REP.
21
(Nov.
2021),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report-20211108.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RV8F-EXKG].
56. “Gamification,” “game-like features,” and “DEPs” could all be used interchangeably
to describe the various features of trading platforms (and many other types of apps) that are
aimed at getting users to stay on and engage with the platform for hours on end. Throughout
this Article, we will refer to these features as DEPs, both to maintain consistency with the SEC,
and also because many features, such as how platforms package and deliver market news to
customers, see infra Section III.C., may not seem as obviously drawn from games as other
features (such as falling confetti to celebrate trades), but which are as perniciously effective at
getting customers to engage in thoughtless and risky trading. See Nicole Casperson, Robinhood
Drops the Confetti, but Advisers Aren’t Convinced, INVESTMENTNEWS (Apr. 6, 2021),
https://www.investmentnews.com/robinhood-drops-the-confetti-but-advisers-arent-convinced204828 [https://perma.cc/P9B7-A4CU] (“Robinhood’s minor redesign [eliminating confetti
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can be put to potentially more constructive uses (for example, to
encourage customers to be more physically active) or potentially more
harmful uses (for example, to encourage customers to spend endless hours
scrolling through Facebook or Instagram). This same principle applies to
the use of DEPs on investment and other financial platforms—they can
encourage prudent financial decision making that benefits customers or
rash decision making that harms customers but benefits the platforms.57
Unfortunately, led by Robinhood, the way many trading platforms
use DEPs appears often to represent a new and improved way to exploit
retail investors and separate them from their money, and that exploitation
is spreading.58 Likely seeing how effectively Robinhood has been able to
use DEPs to juice trading and increase revenue,59 some of its more
traditional competitors “say Robinhood’s app design has put pressure on
them to build similar products in an arms race for young customers.”60 At
the same time, a bevy of new Robinhood competitors has sprung up that
also seeks to use DEPs (including some, such as social networking
features, that even Robinhood does not use) to induce customers to engage
in thoughtless and risky trading.61 The rise of trading platforms that make
predatory use of DEPs62 is also closely related to the decades-old practice
graphics] is ‘placing a Band-Aid over its troubles,’ said Tricia Rosen, owner of RIA Access
Financial Planning. ‘There are much more significant problems with investors using the
Robinhood app than receiving a burst of confetti when they place a trade for the first time.’”).
57. See, e.g., Misyrlena Egkolfopoulou et al., How Robinhood Made Trading Easy—and
Maybe Even Too Hard to Resist, BLOOMBERG WEALTH (Apr. 21, 2021, 3:01 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2021-robinhood-stock-trading-design/?sref=mQvUqJZj
[https://perma.cc/C956-PDLR].
58. See Game Stopped? Who Wins and Loses When Short Sellers, Social Media, and
Retail Investors Collide, Part II: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 117th Cong. 3
(2021)
[hereinafter
Professor
Bogan
Testimony],
https://docs.house.gov/
meetings/BA/BA00/20210317/111355/HHRG-117-BA00-Wstate-BoganV-20210317.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4N2Q-MWMQ] (testimony of Professor Vicki L. Bogan) (explaining that
platforms “that engage in gamification . . . exploit natural human tendencies for achievement
and competition by employing app designs that provide cues, pushes, and rewards to motivate
individuals to make more trades, and encourage repetitive use of their trading app”).
59. According to an analysis, Robinhood’s ratio of order routing revenue to average
account value is $40,683, compared to just $2,079 for TD Ameritrade and $891 for E-Trade.
Geron, supra note 21.
60. Madison Darbyshire, Brokerages Have Snared Legions of Day Traders but Are the
Apps Too Easy To Use, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2021) [hereinafter Brokerages Have Snared
Legions of Day Traders], https://www.ft.com/content/f95ceb63-c5f7-4687-9c21-c664e66cc200
[https://perma.cc/HF6Z-JW5Y].
61. Annie Massa & Akayla Gardner, Robinhood Wannabes Dare Regulators with
Embrace of Games and Prizes, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 15, 2021, 2:03 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-10-15/robinhood-wannabes-dare-regulatorswith-embrace-of-games-prizes?sref=mtQ4hc2k [https://perma.cc/T4LJ-2Z7Z].
62. We use the phrase “predatory use of DEPs” or “predatory DEPs” herein to describe
DEPs that are deployed with the apparent purpose of pushing customers to repeatedly take
actions that are lucrative for the platform while potentially or likely to result in harm to its
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of brokers selling their clients’ orders, otherwise known as “payment for
order flow” (PFOF).
II.PAYMENT FOR ORDER FLOW: THE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST THAT
HARM INVESTORS, FRAGMENT MARKETS, AND FUEL
PREDATORY DEPS
Understanding the proliferation of low- or no-commission trading
platforms like Robinhood requires first understanding the practice of
PFOF, in which HFTs and so-called market makers like Citadel Securities
pay brokers for the right to execute those brokers’ retail clients’ orders.
HFTs and market makers serve an intermediating function by standing
ready to both buy and sell securities, eliminating the need for those who
want to sell stock to find a willing buyer, and vice versa. However, it is
important to note that while HFTs like Citadel Securities functionally act
as market makers, they are not required to register as market makers, and
accordingly largely do not have the obligations that registered, traditional
market makers have, including providing a continuous two-sided market,
serving as the buyer or seller of last resort when there is market volatility,
and to avoid contributing to market volatility.63 Instead, “HFT firms have
largely displaced traditional market makers, reaping the profits without
taking the responsibilities of the traditional position.”64
Although this description is a bit simplistic, HFTs, like more
traditional market makers, make those profits by capturing the spread—
i.e., the difference between the price they are willing to buy a security for
and the price at which they are willing to sell that security, for each trade
they execute. HFT firms like Citadel Securities pay for brokers’ order
flow because the more orders they execute, the more profit they can earn
by capturing the spread on each transaction. In this Section, we briefly
explore the origins of PFOF, its impact on retail investors and the markets,
and how it has led to the rise of trading platforms like Robinhood that
customers, as distinguished from DEPs of various sorts that are not predatory in design, intent,
or effect. We use the term “gamification” to describe the use of DEPs that introduce game-like
elements (such as leaderboards or tasks) to encourage customers to use the platform more. See
Professor Bogan Testimony, supra note 58, at 3.
63. Ian Poirier, High-Frequency Trading and the Flash Crash: Structural Weaknesses in
the Securities Markets and Proposed Regulatory Responses, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 445, 456
(2012). Some HFT firms such as Citadel Securities and Virtu are designated market makers
(DMMs) on exchanges with respect to given securities, and accordingly assume the regulatory
obligations of a market maker with respect to those securities. See The NYSE Market Model,
NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/market-model [https://perma.cc/8RMH-XVPR] (“DMMs have
obligations to maintain fair and orderly markets for their assigned securities.”). However, HFTs
would not have such market-maker obligations with respect to other securities in which they are
functionally acting as market makers in their “internalizer” capacity. According to its website,
Citadel is a DMM with respect to eleven issuers. Your Designated Market Maker, CITADEL
SECS., https://www.citadelsecurities.com/dmm/ [https://perma.cc/GEF7-TPQ3].
64. Poirier, supra note 63, at 456–57.
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make heavy use of DEPs to induce customers to trade more frequently,
which generate more profits for the Robinhoods and Citadel Securities of
the world.
A. Bernie Madoff Pioneers PFOF: Cherry-Picking Uninformed Retail
Order Flow to Maximize Profits
In the 1980s, regulatory changes to the structure of the securities
markets, intended to break the power that big exchanges, predominantly
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), had over stock trading, made it
feasible for smaller players to trade NYSE-listed securities at prices at
least as favorable as those displayed by the NYSE.65 Bernie Madoff (yes,
the convicted, Ponzi-scheming Bernie Madoff66), then a market maker at
the forefront of technological innovation in the securities markets,
recognized that these regulatory changes presented a profit opportunity: if
he could consistently execute trades at prices no worse than displayed by
the NYSE, his firm could assure itself a tidy profit if it was able to
convince brokers to route those trades (i.e., order flow) to him. To
convince brokers to route to his firm instead of the NYSE, Madoff began
paying brokers a penny per share to send him their orders, an enticing
proposition given that the NYSE charged about three cents a share to
execute orders.67
However, Madoff knew he would not make a profit if he accepted
just any orders. For example, if a significant portion of the orders he
executed came from investors with informed views about the direction of
the market, it would increase Madoff’s adverse selection risk, because
those investors would be buying (or selling) from Madoff at a price lower
(or higher) than the true market value of the stock, which they would have
a better view of than Madoff.68 Accordingly, Madoff only paid for small
orders of less than five thousand shares, “reasoning that anyone with
value-relevant information would trade more shares.”69
In fact, Madoff went even further: if a particular broker sent him
orders that proved consistently unprofitable, Madoff would no longer

65. Robert H. Battalio & Tim Loughran, Does Payment for Order Flow to Your Broker
Help or Hurt You, 80 J. BUS. ETHICS 37, 37–38 (2007).
66. Editorial
Staff,
Before
the
Fall,
TRADERS
(Mar.
10,
2009),
https://www.tradersmagazine.com/departments/brokerage/before-the-fall/
[https://perma.cc/6F8K-4LJH] (explaining that before Madoff’s “ignominious end” Madoff
“was considered a leader in the stock trading business who almost single-handedly created the
modern-day Third Market for retail orders by attracting order flow destined for the New York
Stock Exchange”).
67. Battalio & Loughran, supra note 65, at 38–39.
68. See id. at 39, especially for a more detailed and technical explanation of how this
happens.
69. Id.
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accept orders from that broker.70 In other words, Madoff was specifically
targeting the orders of retail investors, which he believed he could profit
from easily because those orders would not represent a view on the
direction of the market as informed as the view he had. Thus, by explicitly
paying brokers cash to send him their retail orders, Madoff had
demonstrated that he could extract excess profits from less informed retail
traders and thus pioneered the practice of PFOF for retail orders.
The business model of specifically seeking out less-informed order
flow to purchase from brokers because it is easier, if not guaranteed, to
profit from persists to this day. For example, it has been reported that
Robinhood in 2020 commanded a premium for its order flow, receiving
up to fifteen times more than other retail brokers like Charles Schwab,
“because the trading firms believed they could score the easiest profits
from Robinhood customers.”71 As Hannah Levintova put it:
Flash traders [HFT firms like Citadel and Virtu] are willing to pay
brokers a premium for the right to execute what the industry calls
“dumb money” trades72—orders from everyman investors who don’t
know as much about the stocks they’re trading as Wall Street
professionals. That’s because, armed with better information,
complex algorithms, and access to private salesrooms, market makers
know they’ll usually be able to arrange a better price than the one the
investor agreed to buy or sell at. They then split the difference, paying
some to Robinhood as PFOF, while keeping the rest for themselves
and usually offering only a sliver of the better price back to the
customer in “price improvement.”73

B. PFOF Spreads, but the Conflicts of Interests and Its Deleterious
Impact on the Markets Are Clear
Madoff’s idea for taking advantage of regulatory changes to extract

70. Id.
71. Nathaniel Popper, Robinhood Has Lured Young Traders, Sometimes with Devastating
Results,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
8,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/07/08/technology/robinhood-risky-trading.html [https://perma.cc/255X-GWPB]; see also
Robinhood Fin., LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10906, Exchange Act Release No. 90694, at
7 (Dec. 17, 2020) (noting that Robinhood had “unusually high [PFOF] rates”).
72. Many people appropriately take offense to the labeling of retail traders as “dumb
money,” but that misses the point correctly captured here: it is the financial industry
professionals (with their practically unlimited resources, maximum real-time market
information from being at the intersection of multiple market flows, and cutting-edge
technology) who refer to retail traders as “dumb money.” That is because they have decades of
quantitative validation (since Madoff first perfected this cherry-picking business model in the
1990s) proving that they maximize their profits from executing retail order flow. That does not
mean that there are not also lots of smart retail traders, lots of retail traders doing robust due
diligence, and many who apparently make money—at least pre-tax—in the short term.
73. Levintova, supra note 8 (footnote added).

KELLEHER, GRIMES, & CHOVIL (DO NOT DELETE)

70

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

5/18/22 4:36 PM

[Vol. 44:51

more revenue quickly caught on and spread.74 As it spread, however, the
SEC and others began to raise serious concerns about the practice, and its
effect on retail investors and the markets.
1. PFOF Poses a Clear Conflict of Interest Between Brokers’ Best
Execution Obligations and Their Desire to Maximize Profits
One of these concerns is that PFOF represents an obvious conflict of
interest between the broker that accepts it (especially if it is a significant
percentage of its profits) and its clients. Brokers have a longstanding
obligation to seek best execution of client orders.75 However, when
brokers are offered payments for routing order flow to particular firms
(which have all the hallmarks of kickbacks or legalized bribery), they face
a temptation to prioritize their own pecuniary interests over their clients’
by routing orders to the highest bidder rather than where they will get the
best execution.76 Madoff then, and PFOF defenders now, make a variety
of arguments in response to the obvious conflict of interest PFOF fuels
between brokers and their clients. Those arguments do not withstand
scrutiny.77
First, PFOF defenders argue that rather than introducing a conflict of
interest that threatens poorer execution for retail investors, PFOF actually
enables them to provide better execution via what they call “price
improvement” for retail investors.78 However, this claim is dubious, at
74. See id. Also, as Professors Battalio and Loughran pointed out when discussing the
origins of PFOF, the NYSE’s competitors could have attracted order flow away from the NYSE
by posting “more aggressive bid and ask prices (which would assist in the price discovery
process for financial markets),” but instead chose to offer inducements to brokers to attract order
flow. Battalio & Loughran, supra note 65, at 38.
75. See Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 270 (3d
Cir. 1998) (“The duty of best execution, which predates the federal securities laws, has its roots
in the common law agency obligations of undivided loyalty and reasonable care that an agent
owes to his principal.”).
76. See The Perils of Payment for Order Flow, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1675, 1686 (1994).
77. In addition to many of those arguments not withstanding scrutiny, many of those
making the pro-PFOF arguments do not withstand scrutiny due to conflicts of interest like taking
money from the PFOF industry. See, e.g., Bought and Paid For, THEMIS TRADING LLC: BLOG
(Dec.
7,
2021),
https://blog.themistrading.com/2021/12/bought-and-paid-for/
[https://perma.cc/E929-NJKH] (discussing a new academic paper supporting PFOF that was
reported in Axios, but where “[t]he authors have a financial relationship with Robinhood” and
then showing why the arguments lack merit).
78. In fact, one very recent “study” claimed that “[d]uring 2020–2021, Robinhood
customers benefited from more than $8 billion in price improvement compared to the national
best bid and offer prices.” See S.P. Kothari et. al, Commission Savings and Execution Quality
for Retail Trades (Dec. 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3976300
[https://perma.cc/Q5ZU-HV97]. However, as a blog post by Themis Trading points out, this
study was bought and paid for by none other than Robinhood itself, and so unsurprisingly
advances the flawed argument that Robinhood customers benefit from Robinhood’s acceptance
of PFOF because they claim “price improvement” relative to the NBBO, even though the NBBO
is a severely flawed benchmark for considering actual price improvement. Bought and Paid
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best, because such claims are benchmarked against the “national best bid
and offer” (NBBO), which, despite its name, is often not the best bid or
offer available to investors.79 For one, the NBBO is disseminated through
a public data feed that consolidates a subset of executable orders from
public U.S. stock exchanges, such as the NYSE. But a significant
percentage of trading volume, often approaching half or more, is handled
off the public exchanges.80 Because trades that happen off-exchange are
excluded from the NBBO, a significant portion of trading activity is
excluded from the NBBO, undermining its use as a benchmark for “price
improvement.”81
Moreover, the NBBO excludes so-called “odd-lot” orders, meaning
an order that is not a “round lot,” which typically means an order for one
hundred shares.82 This too has a significant impact on the calculation of
the NBBO, and accordingly on claims of price improvement benchmarked
to the NBBO. There has been a multi-year increasing trend in odd-lot
trading across markets. Over the course of 2021, the odd-lot rate—the
total number of odd-lot equity trades relative to the total number of equity
trades—has consistently been above fifty percent, typically closer to sixty
percent, meaning more than half of trades on executable orders are not
reflected in the NBBO.83 For stocks priced above $500 per share, odd-lot
orders have been superior to the NBBO as often as seventy-five percent
of trading days.84 One recent study estimated that these, and other issues
For, supra note 77.
79. See Bought and Paid For, supra note 77; see also BETTER MARKETS, FACT SHEET:
PAYMENT FOR ORDER FLOW: HOW WALL STREET COSTS MAIN STREET INVESTORS BILLIONS
OF DOLLARS THROUGH KICKBACKS AND PREFERENTIAL ROUTING OF CUSTOMER ORDERS 8
(2021)
[hereinafter
FACT
SHEET:
PAYMENT
FOR
ORDER
FLOW],
https://bettermarkets.org/sites/default/files/documents/Better_Markets_Payment_for_Order_Fl
ow_Long_02-21-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GB7-6ETT].
80. See Alexander Osipovich, GameStop Mania Highlights Shift to Dark Trading, WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 12, 2021) [hereinafter GameStop Mania Highlights Shift to Dark Trading],
https://www.wsj.com/articles/gamestop-mania-highlights-shift-to-dark-trading-11613125980
[https://perma.cc/7FKG-5VPZ].
81. See SEC STAFF GAMESTOP REPORT, supra note 25, at 14 (explaining that the
exclusion of “off-exchange liquidity” from the calculation of the NBBO demonstrates “the
limitations of relying on the NBBO as the reference point for measuring retail execution
quality”).
82. See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Off-Exchange Market Makers and Their Best Execution
Obligations: An Evolving Mixture of Market Reform, Regulatory Enforcement, and Litigation,
17 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 477, 503 (2021). While “round lot” usually refers to orders for one
hundred shares, the SEC recently adopted revisions to its rules to set forth smaller round lots in
certain equity categories. Market Data Infrastructure, Exchange Act Release No. 34–90610, 86
Fed. Reg. 18,596 (June 8, 2021).
83. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, U.S. Exchanges Odd Lot Rate (%),
https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/datavis/ma_exchange_oddlotrate.html#.YcywsxPMKL8
[https://perma.cc/Q863-DBKF].
84. See Brett Redfearn, Dir., Div. of Trading & Mkts., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Equity
Market Structure 2019: Looking Back & Moving Forward, Remarks at Gabelli School of
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with the NBBO, mean that claims of price improvement benchmarked to
the NBBO are overestimated by at least eight percent.85
Another important point when considering claims of price
improvement is that many active DMMs on the exchanges also are very
active HFTs capturing retail order flow off-exchange.86 This means that
claims of price improvement achieved through internalization are
measured against a benchmark that can be materially influenced by some
of the same firms making markets on the exchanges. This may incentivize
HFTs to quote wider spreads in the public securities markets from time to
time (in their “exchange” market-making capacity) that can be exploited
to capture as much of that spread as possible in their private, internalized
HFT “market-making” capacity.87 In any event, HFTs that are also
DMMs on exchanges, “by virtue of being sole participant trading against
retail order flow, have a wealth of private information giving them a
significant edge over other market-makers on public exchanges,” which
can increase concentration and further distort and harm markets.88
Congressman Jim Hines from Connecticut put it succinctly: “Yes,
when a broker uses [PFOF], you do see price improvement, but you see
price improvement off a really lousy price.”89 And, that “really lousy
Business, Fordham University, New York, New York (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/clayton-redfearn-equity-market-structure-2019
[https://perma.cc/JR7Y-KSSU].
85. See HITESH MITTAL & KATHRYN BERKOW, THE GOOD, THE BAD, & THE UGLY OF
PAYMENT
FOR
ORDER
FLOW
8
(2021),
https://f.hubspotusercontent10.net/
hubfs/4982966/BestEx%20Research%20PFOF%2020210503.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PUK84Z2S].
86. See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Regulating Merchants of Liquidity: Market Making from
Crowded Floors to High-Frequency Trading, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 651, 659 n.29 (2016) (noting
that several HFT firms, including Citadel Securities, GTS, and Virtu, are also designated market
makers); see also Bill Alpert, 2 Charts That Show Why Robinhood Cares So Much About
Payment for Order Flow, BARRON’S (Sept. 1, 2021, 8:02 AM), https://www.barrons.com/
articles/robinhood-payment-for-order-flow-51630451893
[https://perma.cc/BN42-2JDB]
(noting that off-exchange execution by firms like Citadel Securities and Virtu “have taken an
increasing share of retail trading volume from exchanges like the NYSE” resulting in “[t]hose
off-exchange operators now process[ing] more than half of all retail market orders”).
87. There is some empirical evidence that this is exactly what is occurring. See generally
GREGORY W. EATON ET AL., RETAIL TRADER SOPHISTICATION AND STOCK MARKET
QUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM BROKERAGE OUTAGES (2021), https://www.parisdecember.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2021/eaton_2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R932TG9Z].
88. Mittal & Berkow, supra note 85, at 14.
89. Paul Kiernan, Wall Street Pushes Back as SEC Targets Business Practice That
Generates Billions, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2021) [hereinafter Wall Street Pushes Back],
https://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-street-pushes-back-as-sec-targets-business-practice-thatgenerates-billions-11636376401 [https://perma.cc/CU4Y-U5VN]. One broker, Public, that
once accepted PFOF, but stopped in February 2021, analyzed how that affected its execution
quality, determined that it “has been able to achieve excellent price execution for our members
without relying on market makers or PFOF,” and concluded that its analysis “strongly suggests
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price” is often artificially created for the purpose of widening a spread to
maximize the dealers’ profits at the expense of the investor, who is then
misleadingly told she is getting a great deal via “price improvement.”
Second, PFOF defenders argue that PFOF enables low-commission
and no-commission trading. While this is true inasmuch as the kickbacks
paid to brokers can enable them to charge low, or even no, commissions,
and still profitably operate, low-commission and so-called “commissionfree trading” are not the same as low-cost or cost-free trading. What PFOF
enables is not “free trading,” no matter what Robinhood’s CEO or others
say or how many times they say it, but rather hidden-cost trading.90
Indeed, the practical effect of PFOF-enabled no-commission trading is
that it allows brokers to take what would be an upfront, fixed, and fully
disclosed cost, and converts it into “costs [that] are not transparent to the
retail investor.”91
The PFOF conflicts of interests between brokers and their clients,
notwithstanding the claims of its defenders, is illustrated starkly by a
December 2020 SEC enforcement action against none other than
Robinhood.92 According to the SEC, Robinhood—among other things—
misled its customers about its receipt of PFOF.93 While some disclosures
such as trade confirmations and customer agreements mentioned that
Robinhood “may” receive PFOF, its more readily accessible (and likely
more widely read) FAQs about its revenue sources omitted any mention
of PFOF, even though PFOF was (and still is) Robinhood’s biggest source
of revenue. Concealing its receipt of PFOF was an intentional decision
by Robinhood “because it believed that [PFOF] might be viewed as

that Public delivers better execution quality on average to customers than our peer firms that
accept PFOF from market makers.” Stephen Sikes, Delivering on Price Execution Without
PFOF, THE PUB. BLOG (Dec. 2, 2021), https://medium.com/the-public-blog/delivering-onprice-execution-without-pfof-27f0e6098a2f [https://perma.cc/KHH4-URS9].
90. See Mother Jones, supra note 20 (quoting Robinhood CEO claiming “[a]ll of our
trades are free”); see also Helenowski & Levintova, supra note 5. It is remarkable how often
people who hear “commission-free trading” immediately refer to it as “free trading,” including
those experienced in and familiar with financial markets, such as those who are on shows on
CNBC. See, e.g., CNBC Television, Retail Boom and Bust? SEC Scrutiny into Robinhood,
YOUTUBE
(July
7,
2021),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CwLcseGURso
[https://perma.cc/VD47-ETPA].
91. Professor Bogan Testimony, supra note 58, at 2.
92. See Robinhood Fin., LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10906, Exchange Act Release
No. 90694 (Dec. 17, 2020). Robinhood neither admitted nor denied the allegations.
93. Id. at 7–9. Author Hannah Levintova observed that “[t]he same year that Robinhood
launched, financial journalist Michael Lewis published Flash Boys—an exposé of highfrequency trading firms that shed light on how [PFOF] deals were negotiated by Wall Street,”
the “conflicts of interest,” and “how trading firms’ order flow profits [come] at the expense of
everyday investors.” Levintova, supra note 8. After noting that the book “touched off a
firestorm on Wall Street and in Washington,” she detailed how Robinhood then concealed its
receipt of PFOF from the public and customers. Id.
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controversial by customers.”94
Additionally, Robinhood lied95 to its customers about execution
quality while knowingly giving its customers inferior execution.
Beginning in 2018, in response to media reports about poor execution
quality, Robinhood began claiming on its website that it matched or beat
the execution quality of its competitors. This was even though Robinhood
had been generally aware there was a tradeoff between the size of PFOF
payments and execution quality—the larger the PFOF payment, the worse
the execution quality—and still demanded “unusually high” PFOF
payments. In fact, by 2018, when it began claiming its execution quality
equaled or matched its competitors’, Robinhood had begun to undertake
an analysis of its order-routing practices which confirmed that its
execution quality “was worse in many respects” than its competitors’.96
By March 2019, “a more extensive internal analysis . . . found [that]
Robinhood’s execution quality and price improvement metrics were
substantially worse than other retail broker-dealers’ in many respects.”97
Nevertheless, Robinhood both (1) maintained the order-routing practices
that were leading to substantially worse execution quality, and (2)
continued to publicly and falsely insist that it matched or beat its
competitors’ execution quality.
These facts are damning. The SEC determined that Robinhood’s
order-routing practices based on PFOF (enabled by Robinhood’s
fraudulent statements about them) cost its retail customers a lot more
money than what they would have paid if they paid a commission:
Between October 2016 and June 2019, certain Robinhood orders
94. Robinhood Fin., LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10906, Exchange Act Release No.
90694, at 2 (Dec. 17, 2020). The use of “controversial” here is a flag that one of the biggest
benefits of settling with prosecutors and regulators like the SEC is that the settling party gets to
negotiate not just the penalty and the violations, but also the very language of the documents
announcing the settlement. Of all the things customers might think about Robinhood truthfully
disclosing that it gets most of its revenue from HFT firms buying their orders, “controversial”
would seem pretty low on the list. One can presume that Robinhood correctly believed that its
customers would see this conflicted financial arrangement as a red warning flag, which is why
they presumably chose to conceal it.
95. It should be noted that—considering the facts stated in the order, see supra notes 86–
92—it is difficult to understand how only the company was charged and then only with
disclosure violations under Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3). The facts appear to clearly detail
multiple examples of Robinhood, and several of its officers and employees, engaging in
knowing fraudulent conduct which would appear to have violated Section 10(b) and other
provisions of the Exchange Act and the rules promulgated thereunder. See Robinhood Fin.,
LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10906, Exchange Act Release No. 90694 (Dec. 17, 2020).
Nonetheless, the SEC, in the waning days of the Trump administration, choose to settle this case
charging only the company and only for disclosure and recordkeeping violations. See id. at 10–
16.
96. Robinhood Fin., LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10906, Exchange Act Release No.
90694, at 2–3 (Dec. 17, 2020).
97. Id. (emphasis added).
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lost a total of approximately $34.1 million in price improvement
compared to the price improvement they would have received had
they been placed at competing retail broker-dealers, even after netting
the approximately $5 per-order commission costs those brokerdealers were charging at the time.98

Do not miss the point of the SEC’s statement here: Robinhood’s
customers lost more than $34 million due to undisclosed costs associated
with their acceptance of PFOF “even after” assuming they had paid a “$5
per-order commission!”
So much for either “free trading” or
“commission-free trading.” Moreover, even the amount of $34.1 million
that was deceptively extracted from Robinhood’s customers understates
how much was ripped off because the analysis used to determine the
amount included the NBBO for its view of “price improvement,” which,
as discussed above, is misleading and incomplete. The facts in the SEC’s
order make clear that Robinhood—the self-proclaimed democratizer of
finance for the masses—willfully ripped off its retail customers so that it
could pocket tens of millions of dollars in PFOF from the HFT firms like
Citadel Securities, to whom it sold its clients’ order flow.
2. PFOF Has a Deleterious Impact on the Markets More Broadly
Another concern that has persisted since the advent of PFOF is its
deleterious impact on the securities markets. Specifically, PFOF
“threatens the structure of the equity-trading market” because PFOFrelated “fragmentation may erode crucial aspects of a healthy capital
market, such as liquidity, price discovery, pricing efficiency, public
confidence, competitiveness, and price stability.”99 The primary reason
for this is that orders routed to HFTs that make PFOF payments are by
and large executed off public exchanges, either through internalization
(i.e., executed against the HFT’s own inventory) or after being routed to
other non-public trading venues or so-called “alternative trading systems,”
also known as “ATSs” or “dark markets.”100
This has a number of concerning second-order effects: it fragments
liquidity, segments retail order flow such that a significant portion of retail
orders are executed in dark markets—where they never have a chance to
interact with orders on public exchanges, and creates competitive pressure
for public exchanges to offer inducements to attract order flow—which

98. Id. at 10 (emphasis added). A very recent study by the Dutch Authority for the
Financial Markets comes to the same conclusion, finding that customer orders routed to venues
that paid for those orders received price improvement, at most, eight percent of the time. Philip
Stafford, Retail Investors Lose Out When Brokers Sell Their Orders, Dutch Regulator Warns,
FIN. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2022), https://www.ft.com/content/4d5866b6-b723-416e-92b2940d28d303a6 [https://perma.cc/CNK4-GLBG].
99. The Perils of Payment for Order Flow, supra note 76, at 1680–81 (footnote omitted).
100. Kelleher Testimony, supra note 47, at 13–14.
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further fragments the markets while creating additional conflicts of
interest. Moreover, because it contributes to market fragmentation and
reduces liquidity in the public markets, the spreads are wider and,
therefore, the cost of capital for companies raising capital in the public
markets is higher than it otherwise would be, undermining efficient capital
formation and allocation.101 In short, PFOF is both a cause and a
consequence of the needless fragmentation of the U.S. securities markets,
which ultimately undermines the strength of those markets.102
C. How PFOF Is Fueling the Rise of Trading Platforms and Predatory
DEPs
The upshot is that PFOF poses real and significant risks, both to the
retail investors whose orders HFTs purchase from brokers and the markets
more broadly.103 Nevertheless, the SEC chose not to meaningfully
regulate PFOF, and its use has continued since Bernie Madoff originated
the concept. The practice has become highly lucrative for brokers who
received an extraordinary $2.6 billion in total PFOF payments in 2020.104
It became even more lucrative in 2021 with the dozen largest brokers
receiving thirty-three percent more in PFOF than they did in 2020—which
amounted to $3.8 billion.105 Presumably, executing those purchased
orders is extraordinarily profitable for HFTs, who would not have paid
$3.8 billion in 2021 for that order flow unless they knew they could make
some significant amount above that PFOF “cost” from executing those
orders.106
Beyond the concerns about conflicts of interest and how PFOF
contributes to market fragmentation, the aspect of PFOF most directly
101. See Cheryl Nichols, The Importance of Selective Federal Preemption in the U.S.
Securities Regulatory Framework: A Lesson from Canada, Our Neighbor to the North, 10
CHAP. L. REV. 391, 395 (2006) (“Too much fragmentation will increase the cost of
capital . . . .”).
102. ( Id.
103. Ultimately, a fulsome, technical explanation of the pitfalls of PFOF is beyond the
scope of this Article. However, for a more comprehensive explanation of the risks posed by
PFOF see FACT SHEET: PAYMENT FOR ORDER FLOW, supra note 79, and the Kelleher Testimony,
supra note 47, at 9–21.
104. See Alexander Osipovich, GameStop Mania Drives Scrutiny of Payments to Online
Brokers, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2021) [hereinafter GameStop Mania Drives Scrutiny of Payments
to Online], https://www.wsj.com/articles/gamestop-mania-drives-scrutiny-of-payments-toonline-brokers-11612434601 [https://perma.cc/6BF4-W3A4].
105. See Alexander Osipovich, Payments to U.S. Brokers Surged Amid Meme-Stock and
Options Boom, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 1, 2022, 3:02 PM) [hereinafter Payments to U.S. Brokers
Surged],
https://www.wsj.com/articles/payments-to-u-s-brokers-surged-amid-meme-stockand-options-boom-11643745771?st=5hubdn0wo6s2c5n&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink
[https://perma.cc/3UCL-VLA8].
106. Id. It is noteworthy that “Citadel Securities continued to be the biggest source of
[PFOF]” at $1.5 billion in 2021 and that purchasing options trades ($2.5 billion in PFOF) were
much more lucrative than equity trades ($1.3 billion in PFOF). Id.
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relevant here is how PFOF has fueled the use of predatory DEPs by
platforms like Robinhood. The most obvious way is that HFTs pay
brokers more and more as brokers’ route increased order flow to them.107
Accordingly, a broker stands to make more money the more its clients
trade.
In addition, the economics of PFOF also mean HFTs are willing to
pay more for riskier trades. As explained above, one of the ways that
HFTs like Citadel Securities profit from executing retail orders is by
collecting the spread between what they are willing to buy a stock for
(their bid) and what they are willing to sell the stock for (their offer).
Accordingly, the larger the spread, and the more profit available to the
HFT, the more they are willing to pay in PFOF to brokers. Spreads are
higher in less liquid small-cap stocks as well as riskier and more volatile
products, such as options.108 Therefore, HFTs pay more for those orders,
meaning trades in those risky products—options in particular—are the
most lucrative for trading platforms such as Robinhood.109 Indeed, it has
been reported that brokers received $2.2 billion in PFOF for options trades
from June 2020 to June 2021, sixty percent higher than what they received
for selling equities orders.110 It was almost one hundred percent higher
for the full year 2021.111 All of this influences the way those platforms
are marketed and designed.
III. TRADING PLATFORM DEPS AND THEIR EFFECT ON RETAIL
INVESTORS
The new generation of no-commission trading platforms makes a
significant portion of their revenue from PFOF and similar kickbacks.112
107. SEC STAFF GAMESTOP REPORT, supra note 25, at 44 (“In addition, [PFOF] and the
incentives it creates may cause broker-dealers to find novel ways to increase customer trading,
including through the use of digital engagement practices.”).
108. Kate Rooney & Maggie Fitzgerald, Here’s How Robinhood Is Raking in Record
Cash on Customer Trades—Despite Making It Free, CNBC (Aug. 14, 2020, 12:08 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/13/how-robinhood-makes-money-on-customer-trades-despitemaking-it-free.html [https://perma.cc/2ZHW-YH59].
109. Id.; see also Payments to U.S. Brokers Surged, supra note 105. Options trading is
significantly riskier than equities trading because, in addition to the extraordinary complexity
of options products, they utilize leverage which can “amplify losses.” FED. RSRV. FIN.
STABILITY REP., supra note 55, at 21; see also Paul Kiernan, Investors Are Using Robinhood,
Other Platforms to Jump into Options Trades, Worrying U.S. Regulators, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8,
2021) [hereinafter Investors Are Using Robinhood to Jump into Options Trades],
https://www.wsj.com/articles/investors-are-using-robinhood-other-platforms-to-jump-intooptions-trades-worrying-u-s-regulators-11638886109 [https://perma.cc/E7R5-UGMW].
110. Alexander Osipovich & Gunjan Banerji, How Robinhood Cashes In on the Options
Boom, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 31, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-robinhood-cashes-inon-the-options-boom-11635681600 [https://perma.cc/274F-2BD3].
111. See also Payments to U.S. Brokers Surged, supra note 105.
112. As Robinhood has explained in its securities filings, the kickbacks it receives for
routing equities and options order flow is referred to as PFOF, while it refers to the kickbacks
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For example, around seventy-seven percent of Robinhood’s 2021 revenue
came from PFOF and related kickbacks.113 Therefore, because they are
primarily concerned with maximizing profits, it can be expected that they
will design their platforms to maximize PFOF, both by encouraging
customers to trade more frequently, and by encouraging customers to
trade in products like options that are more lucrative for platforms, even
if highly risky and potentially ruinous for their customers.114 That is
particularly true now that it is a public company virtually required to show
quarter-over-quarter and year-over-year revenue and profit growth to
support its own stock price. And indeed, this is exactly what we see.
Robinhood has been “built on a Silicon Valley playbook of
behavioral nudges and push notifications.”115 In turn, this “Silicon Valley
playbook” is explicitly concerned with using a variety of DEPs “to
motivate individuals to make more trades, and encourage repetitive use of
their trading app.”116
Tech developers, like slot machine designers, strive to maximize the
user’s “time on device.” They do so by designing habit-forming
products—products that draw consciously on the same behavioral
design strategies that the casino industry pioneered. The predictable
result is that most tech users spend more time on device than they
would like . . . .117

The tools that trading platforms have borrowed from other apps to
increase engagement and induce traders to engage in more frequent and
riskier trading include:
§ Celebrations for trading, including confetti or applause;
§ Games and contests with leaderboards and prizes, ranging from free

it receives for routing cryptocurrency orders as “Transaction Rebates.” See ROBINHOOD
MARKETS, INC. FORM 10-K 21 (2022), https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK0001783879/5da70128-0b89-456d-802a-047969b23ad9.pdf [https://perma.cc/QQ9H-762U].
However, the distinction is not relevant to this Article.
113. Id. at 92.
114. “Robinhood is really just an options trading racket. . . . [H]ardly anyone makes
money in options except the folks who sell them to you. . . . Robinhood squeezes 9.5% out of
option accounts for itself vs. 1.2% for crypto and 0.2% for stocks.” Andy Kessler, Can
Robinhood Ride the Bull?, WALL ST. J. (July 11, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/canrobinhood-ride-the-bull-11626025309 [https://perma.cc/X8KK-FAAK].
115. Melanie Cherdack, Trading in the Time of Covid: A Robinhood Bromance, 28
PIABA BAR J. 159, 162 (2021).
116. Professor Bogan Testimony, supra note 58, at 3.
117. Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Habit-Forming Technology, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 129,
129 (2019); see also Matthew Knipfer, Optimally Climbing the Robinhood Cash Management
Waitlist, MEDIUM (Nov. 5, 2019), https://matthewknipfer.medium.com/optimally-climbingthe-robinhood-cash-management-waitlist-f94218764ea7
[https://perma.cc/JDN6-LDKM]
(“This is not a broker anymore. It is a casino.”).
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stock to cash and free subscriptions;
§ Embedded social networking tools, including the ability to mimic
the trading of others;
§ Rewards for recruiting others to the app;
§ Suggested trading strategies such as options and trading on margin;
§ Check-the-box disclosures even on complex investment products
such as options;
§ Notifications and nudges, showing which stocks are up or down;
supposedly “breaking” market news; lists of the most popular or top
moving stocks; and the number of days since the customer’s most
recent trade; and
§ Misleading claims that trading is “commission free.”

While some of these DEPs (such as falling confetti and trading levels)
are more obviously “game-like” than others (such as push notifications
with “breaking” market news), they are all designed to the same end—
capturing and dominating customers’ attention and ensuring they spend as
much time on the app as possible.118
Ultimately, this “Silicon Valley playbook” has been used to great
effect by a variety of apps, from social media apps like Facebook and
Twitter to actual games like Candy Crush, and even to apps designed to
prevent childhood obesity.119 Surely many people with a smart phone
have had the experience of looking up from their phones only to find they
have wasted an entire afternoon scrolling through Facebook, or spent
nearly their entire lunch break mindlessly tapping the screen trying to beat
their high score in Candy Crush.
Unlike Facebook or Candy Crush, however, customers of trading
platforms are not just whiling away idle time. They are putting real money
at risk. And Robinhood and other trading platforms are not just ordinary
apps but are also broker-dealers and thus are subject to securities
regulations at both the federal and state level. One of the primary concerns
of securities regulation is, in turn, investor protection, in particular
118. Of course, Robinhood and its many allies, mostly direct or indirect financial
beneficiaries of Robinhood, reject these claims and, following the adage that offense is the best
defense, its CEO penned an Op Ed in the Wall Street Journal claiming that criticism of its
predatory business practices is really nothing more than an attack on its retail customers. Vlad
Tenev, Robinhood Users Come Under Attack, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2021, 6:25 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/robinhood-users-regulation-retail-investing-order-flow-accessto-capital-investing-11632776071 [https://perma.cc/WUW2-YTC7].
119. Langvardt, supra note 117, at 130–33; Nathan Jeffay, To Fight Childhood Obesity,
Israeli Docs Prescribe App That Gamifies Weight Loss, TIMES ISR. (Oct. 13, 2021, 8:07 PM),
https://www.timesofisrael.com/to-fight-childhood-obesity-israeli-docs-prescribe-app-thatgamifies-weight-loss/ [https://perma.cc/X6HT-MUZT].
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preventing unscrupulous actors from ripping off and exploiting investors.
In this Section, we will first explore some of the predatory ways
platforms use DEPs that raise particular investor protection concerns
because they are highly effective at luring customers into the platform and
then getting those customers to trade more often and more thoughtlessly:
(1) offers of free stock and other prizes, (2) the misleading marketing of
“commission-free” trading, (3) how trading platforms provide
information to customers, and (4) social networking features. We then
explain how Robinhood’s effective use of predatory DEPs works to get
customers to constantly engage with the app for the purpose of inducing
frequent and higher risk trading—to Robinhood’s profit but its customers’
detriment—what might be thought of as Robin Hood in reverse.
A. Offers of Free Stock and Other “Prizes” for Opening Accounts and
Repeatedly Engaging with the Platform Are a Predatory Use of
DEPs
One of the primary ways that trading platforms lure customers into
downloading and beginning to use their apps is through offers of free stock
and other prizes for signing up for the platforms and engaging in other
activities. For example, Robinhood offers new customers a free stock
upon opening an account,120 but this offer serves multiple purposes for
Robinhood:
For the first-time user who downloads the app out of curiosity,
Robinhood instantly begins to pull you into its world. After a lessthan-five-minute sign-up process, there’s an offer to get a free single
share of stock. Until recently, a digital scratch-off ticket appeared,
letting you reveal which stock you won . . . It quickly gives a neophyte
investor a stock to watch—a natural reason to keep paying attention
to the app. Users can get notifications of the stock’s movements.121

This offer of a free stock is less than it appears to be—Robinhood’s
advertising focuses on the possibility of receiving high-value, blue-chip
stocks like Microsoft, but Robinhood randomly picks which free stock to
provide, meaning customers are actually much more likely to end up with
a low-value, less well-known stock.122 Other trading platforms have
120. Open Account, Get Free Stock, ROBINHOOD, https://robinhood.com/
us/en/support/articles/open-account-get-free-stock/ [https://perma.cc/T7D2-DPUN].
121. gkolfopoulou et al., supra note 57; see also Paul Kiernan, Regulators Scrutinize a
Robinhood Ploy: Free Shares, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 25, 2021, 7:30 AM) [hereinafter Robinhood
Ploy], https://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators-scrutinize-a-robinhood-marketing-ploy-freeshares-11629891014 [https://perma.cc/XB75-EW2E].
122. John Bromels, Robinhood’s Free Stock Offer Isn’t All It’s Cracked Up to Be,
MOTLEY
FOOL
(Sept.
3,
2020,
9:46
AM),
https://www.fool.com/
investing/2020/09/03/robinhoods-free-stock-offer-isnt-all-its-cracked-u/
[https://perma.cc/Q2NY-CRTU].
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copied this approach. Webull offers customers the chance to spin a wheel
to win prizes such as Tesla stock, gift cards, or Apple iPads.123 Another
platform, SoFi, “dangles as much as $1,000 in free stocks, accompanied
by an illustration of a pile of wrapped gifts.”124 Another, Stash Financial,
has a “stock party” website “where users can fire off confetti while waiting
for share giveaways.”125
And in addition to its offer of a free, random stock for opening an
account, Robinhood also offers its customers the ability to win other prizes
for continuously engaging with its platform, including one promotion
where customers could climb the waitlist for a to-be-launched cash
management product, an FDIC-insured transaction account for
Robinhood’s brokerage customers that Robinhood indicated would offer
a 2.05% annual percentage yield,126 by clicking over and over again.127
Unlike getting a “free” stock, Robinhood customers could tap on the app
up to one thousand times per day every day, seven days a week to advance
on the waitlist to get access to its cash management product when
launched. This DEP resulted in a waitlist of more than 500,000 people!128
These offers of random stocks and other random prizes not only
entice customers to sign up for and continuously use the trading platform,
but also condition customers to go to the app frequently and to the idea
that using the platform for stock trading is like a game. For example, one
Robinhood customer explained that he signed up for Robinhood to take
advantage of the free stock promotion, which netted him a stock worth
about five dollars. Before long, he went from having a single stock that
he did little with, to having ninety percent of his assets tied up in
Robinhood, to the point that he found was having trouble purchasing
groceries.129
B. Heavy Marketing of So-Called “Commission-Free” Trading Is a
Misleading DEP that Induces Customers to Sign Up for Trading
Platforms and Trade More Frequently
Another misleading DEP that raises serious investor protection
concerns is the way that platforms bombard customers with misleading

123. Massa & Gardner, supra note 61.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Introducing Cash Management, ROBINHOOD BLOG (Oct. 8, 2019),
https://blog.robinhood.com/news/2019/10/8/introducing-cash-management
[https://perma.cc/U9NB-W3R9]. As of December 10, 2021, Robinhood’s cash management
product offers a 0.30% APY. What Is Cash Management, ROBINHOOD, https://robinhood.com/
us/en/support/articles/what-is-cash-management/ [https://perma.cc/E5KH-8ZPE].
127. Knipfer, supra note 117.
128. Id.
129. Massa & Gardner, supra note 61.
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claims that they offer “commission-free” trading.130 First, such claims are
inherently misleading, as noted above in Section III.A. While platforms
say “commission-free trades,” customers almost certainly hear just “free
trades,”131 but “commission-free” is not the same as “cost-free,” and, in
fact, when a trading platform accepts PFOF, its customers are almost
certainly paying a premium cost—a cost that, unlike the typical
commission, is hidden and variable.132
Second, Robinhood leans heavily on the promise of “commissionfree” trades in its marketing to prospective and current customers, which
is one of the primary reasons that Robinhood has succeeded in signing up
huge numbers of young and less-experienced traders and getting them to
trade so frequently.133 There is little doubt that the promise of
“commission-free trading,” which customers almost certainly hear as
simply “free trading,” results in more (not truly free) trades, meaning more
extraction of revenue from customers. This is because offers of a “free”
product lead to what behavioral economists have termed the “zero-price
effect” or “free effect,” in which the offer of “a free good can have a much
stronger lure than its actual value.”134 This can cause consumers to
become “affective rather than rational decision makers, perhaps due to an
emotional response or to a cognitive bias.”135 Ultimately, it appears that
offers of “free” goods can act as a sort of “nudge,” similar to news alerts
and other types of DEPs, that can “can be used to change the conduct of
consumers to prefer a product which does not advance their otherwise

130. Marketing of “commission-free” trading may not intuitively seem like a DEP.
However, marketing of “commission-free” trading fits well within the “Silicon Valley playbook
of behavioral nudges and push notifications,” Cherdack, supra note 115, at 162, because, as
explained infra at notes 132–36, promises of “free” tend to act as a nudge that causes customers
to change their behavior.
131. See Better Markets, Dennis Kelleher Discussing PFOF on CNBC’s Fast Money on
July 7, 2021, YOUTUBE (July 7, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nPWztxtr7w&t=95s [https://perma.cc/V9Z8-UYTK]. When the CNBC host said that “what the retail
investor gets is free trading,” Kelleher responded by saying, among other things, “they don’t get
free trading. This is the problem. They brag about ‘commission-free trading,’ but retail traders
hear ‘free trading.’” Id. at 01:37.
132. Id.; see also Sheila Bair, SEC Needs to Find a Way to Curb Payment for Order Flow,
FIN. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/696a15e0-64f1-4800-af794d0a882df5b2 [https://perma.cc/XHZ9-AHX2] (“But it is far from clear whether PFOF actually
reduces costs for retail investors, or simply makes their costs less transparent.”).
133. See Siqi Wang, Note, Consumers Beware: How Are Your Favorite “Free”
Investment Apps Regulated?, 19 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 43, 49 (2021) (“Investment apps,
including Robinhood and Acorns, have accumulated and drawn millions of users, mostly
younger people, by marketing themselves with commission-free or low-cost investing and being
mobile-friendly.”).
134. Michal S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: Implications
for Antitrust Enforcement, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 528 (2016).
135. Id. at 530.
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revealed preferences.”136
Indeed, in this respect Robinhood’s business model shares some
similarities with so-called “freemium” games. These are games that
purport to be free to download and play and are heavily marketed as such.
However, once you start playing the game you find you actually have to
pay for many of the features that make the game enjoyable.137 Like
Robinhood, these types of games take advantage of the fact that when an
item is marketed as “free” to use—i.e., with no upfront cost—consumers
have a tendency to underestimate the potential true cost of using that
item.138 Except, at least in the case of freemium games, eventually the
true cost is revealed to players. With so-called “commission-free trading”
platforms like Robinhood, by contrast, the true cost is never revealed to
customers.
C. The So-Called “Education and Informational” Tools of Platforms
like Robinhood Are Not “For Informational Purposes Only,” but
Are Also Designed to Induce Customers to Trade More
Another less obviously game-like DEP put to predatory use by
platforms like Robinhood, but one which is still critically important to
getting customers to trade frequently and impulsively, is how those
platforms purport to provide market news and information to customers.
Robinhood’s CEO Vladimir Tenev has tried hard to distinguish
Robinhood’s supposedly more “informational” features from its more
obvious game-like features. For example, in his testimony before the
House Financial Services Committee, Tenev claimed that although he is
not “aware of any agreed upon definition of ‘gamification,’” that
Robinhood actually does not “offer rewards or levels to encourage more
trading” and only “sparingly use[s] features like confetti animation to
celebrate certain infrequent milestone events or a reward stock for signing
up or referring friends.”139 Apparently what he wants to claim are the
136. Id. at 531.
137. See Shani Shisha, Fairness, Copyright, and Video Games: Hate the Game, Not the
Player, 31 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 694, 713 (2021).
The net effect is that consumers tend to believe that free-to-play games cost less
than what they actually do. Consumers hence fail to fully account for the costs of
in-game microtransactions. Behavioral economists have long recognized that
consumers are beset by a battery of systemic failures, most notably myopia and
over-optimism.
Sellers respond to these shortcomings by (a) crafting
extraordinarily complex contracts, and (b) relying on deferred cost schemes.
Id. at 714 (footnotes omitted).
138. See id.
139. See Game Stopped? Who Wins When Short Sellers, Social Media, and Retail
Investors Collide: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 117th Cong. 6 (2021)
[hereinafter Tenev Testimony], https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/BA00/20210218/111207/
HHRG-117-BA00-Wstate-TenevV-20210218.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7BWW-CACC]
(testimony of Vladimir Tenev).
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primary markers of gamification.140 Instead, according to Tenev,
Robinhood’s design is intended to provide customers “with tools and
information to learn about investing and keep tabs on their finances,”
including information on “price movements, upcoming earnings calls,
and breaking news,” which “are for informational purposes only.”141
However, the way that Robinhood, and platforms like it, provide
information to customers is actually one of the key tactics for inducing
thoughtless and impulsive trading. As scholars Sayan Chaudhry and
Chinmay Kulkarni, who study the interaction of software design and
human behavior, put it, “making trading easier or increasing access to
information backfires. Indeed, it encourages investors to trade more
actively and perform even worse.”142 Platforms can make design choices
that will decrease this tendency, for example, by ensuring that when
providing market news, it is placed in appropriate context to be understood
in line with broader market fundamentals.143 However, Chaudhry and
Kulkarni find that Robinhood’s platform is designed to provide
information in a way intended take advantage of well-known cognitive
biases that can cause retail investors to make impulsive decisions.
For example, investor decisions can be unduly “biased by more vivid
and memorable movements in stock prices.”144 A platform designed to
counteract this tendency and encourage more deliberative trading would
avoid featuring a list of stocks whose prices have moved the most.
By contrast Robinhood prominently features a top-movers list.145
These lists, and other features, inundate customers with a constant stream
of selected market news prominently featured in such a way as to give the
impression that the news, often relatively unremarkable, is significant and
demands attention—if not urgent action. As the Massachusetts secretary
of state put it in the state’s complaint against Robinhood, this “is no
different from a broker-dealer agent handing a list of securities to a
customer, pretending to be surprised when the customer purchases
securities from that list, and then proclaiming that he made no
recommendations to the customer.”146
Robinhood also appears to have designed its push notifications and
“daily-movers” list in a particularly insidious manner to unconsciously
140. Subsequent to the CEO’s testimony, Robinhood stopped using confetti. Caitlin
McCabe, Robinhood to Remove Controversial Digital Confetti from Trading App, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/robinhood-to-remove-controversial-digitalconfetti-from-trading-app-11617195612?mod=Searchresults_pos8&page=1
[https://perma.cc/ZK28-6X2K].
141. Tenev Testimony, supra note 139, at 6.
142. Chaudhry & Kulkarni, supra note 24, at 779.
143. See generally id.
144. Id. at 781.
145. Id. at 784.
146. Administrative Complaint, supra note 17, at 5.
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provoke increased trading by its customers:
You might expect that Robinhood’s interface would trumpet
customers’ wins, but the app is also crafted in a way that calls attention
to losses. The app comes set up to send customers push notifications
when their stocks move, no matter the direction. The company’s up
and down “Daily Movers” list stands out from similar features on
other sites that put the gainers front and center. In a 2020 study, a
group of business school professors found that this particular design
choice drew Robinhood users to trade stocks on the list far more
intensely than traders at other brokerages, who are drawn more to
gainers. “We do find investors lose money in the whole process,” says
Xing Huang, a business professor at Washington University of St.
Louis, and one of the study’s authors.
Years of research in behavioral science have shown147 that people
who see losses are motivated to chase them, notes Schüll, like roulette
players doubling down after a bad spin. She calls it “the chasing
effect, where you want to gamble more on other stocks to make that
up, to race to get it back.”148

Ultimately, these types of features can “intensify user reactions to
unexceptional numbers and drive action.”149 Chaudhry and Kulkarni
developed a set of “best practices” to apply when designing a trading
platform that would encourage more deliberative and less impulsive
trading and found that in nearly every instance Robinhood’s platform is
instead designed to encourage thoughtless and reckless trading.150
D. Social Network-Like Features Encourage Thoughtless “Copy”
Trading
Another troubling type of DEP being increasingly used by trading
platforms is the use of social network-like features that allow customers
to see, and mimic, the trading activity of other customers. One of the most
147. See, e.g., Melanie Rose Dixon et al., What Characterizes Excessive Online Stock
Trading? A Qualitative Study, J. GAMBLING ISSUES, May 2018, at 8, https://jgi.camh.net/
index.php/jgi/article/view/3996/4229 [https://perma.cc/H29Y-VZ46].
148. Levintova, supra note 8; see also Brad M. Barber et al., Attention-Induced Trading
Returns: Evidence from Robinhood Users, J. FIN. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3715077 [https://perma.cc/5G87-AY98] (footnote added); GAMING
WALL STREET, supra note 1 (discussing how many Redditors on r/wallstreetbets would post
pictures of their account statements showing their GameStop or other losses, referred to as “loss
porn”).
149. Madison Darbyshire, Traders Phone Up Gambling Helplines as Game-like Broker
Apps Spread, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2021) [hereinafter Traders Phone Up Gambling Helplines],
https://www.ft.com/content/8f9bbc77-06b1-4fbd-8b7e-6e381ba038a7
[https://perma.cc/WMQ6-7S6U].
150. Chaudhry & Kulkarni, supra note 24.
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prominent trading platforms that utilizes social networking features is
eToro, which specializes in “copy trading.”151 Essentially, eToro’s
platform allows customers to see who “the most successful traders are”
and then to “automatically copy those users’ trades.”152 Other platforms
are following suit—a trading platform called Iris alerts its customers
“when friends, influencers[,] or celebrities make trades, and lets them
mimic the moves by sending orders to their broker.”153
The pitfalls of combining social networking features with stock
trading are obvious. Successful investing requires careful consideration
of each individual’s specific investment objectives in light of their
personal financial situation, goals, and resources. eToro and other
platforms that enable customers to see and copy the trades of others
discourages this sort of careful, considered investing. Instead, it
encourages customers to thoughtlessly mimic the trades of other
customers, which can be potentially disastrous if those other customers
have different financial circumstances, risk appetites, and objectives, or if
those other customers are simply bad at investing.154
E. Predatory DEPs Work to Induce Frequent and Risky Trading to the
Detriment of Retail Investors
Ultimately, these predatory DEPs work largely as presumably
designed and intended to induce customers to engage in risky trading with
little thought or consideration. Robinhood customers trade much more
frequently than the customers of other brokers; for example, one analysis
found that Robinhood customers trade forty times as many shares as
Charles Schwab customers.155 The complaint filed by the Massachusetts
secretary of state against Robinhood also details how successful
Robinhood’s DEPs are at inducing frequent trading by its customers.156 It
notes that at least 241 Robinhood customers with no investment
experience nevertheless traded at least five times a day, including twentyfive customers with no experience who nevertheless traded more than
fifteen times per day, with some of them making thousands of trades over
the course of just a few years.157
Perhaps nothing underscores how effective the predatory DEPs used
151. Harry Robertson, These Apps Are Betting ‘Social Trading’ Is the Next Big Thing in
Investing, as Millennials and Gen Zers Seek Advice from Influencers and Friends, INSIDER
(Nov. 13, 2021, 8:02 AM), https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/social-copytrading-millennials-gen-z-retail-investing-finfluencers-2021-11
[https://perma.cc/ZLD4DBLL].
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Popper, supra note 71.
156. Administrative Complaint, supra note 17.
157. Id. at 14–18.
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by platforms such as Robinhood are as the marked increase in calls to
gambling addiction helplines from day traders. Many of those traders
appear to be developing a compulsion to trade thanks to trading platforms’
use of “prompts, animations, rewards and digital flourishes [that] have
brought the feel of investing platforms closer to online sports betting and
gambling.”158 This has been referred to as the “the Robinhood effect.”159
For these customers, the frequent trading Robinhood’s platform is
designed to encourage results in something far worse than the 6.5% each
year that frequent traders can be expected to trail the market.160 For these
customers, gamification also causes them to develop an addiction that can
destroy their finances, their careers, their relationships, and even their
lives.161
Even more concerning, Robinhood customers are fueling a boom in
the trading of risky options by retail investors,162 with a New York Times
analysis finding that Robinhood customers “bought and sold [eightyeight] times as many risky options contracts as Schwab customers, relative
to the average account size.”163 That is because Robinhood makes it
extraordinarily easy for its retail investors to trade in options,164 which
belies how complex and extraordinarily risky these products are. Thus, it
is unsurprising that Robinhood’s customers trade options so frequently,
even though options trades are typically unsuitable for the typical
Robinhood customer who has little if any stock market experience and
less money to lose.165
To qualify for options trading, a Robinhood customer simply needs
to self-attest to having investment experience greater than “none” and a
risk appetite that is “medium” or greater.166 Once a customer has made
this minimal self-attestation, making potentially ruinous options trades is
just a few clicks away.167 Even worse, the Massachusetts secretary of state
alleges that Robinhood has not even adequately enforced its own minimal
policies and procedures to approve customers for options trading:
158. Traders Phone Up Gambling Helplines, supra note 149.
159. Id.
160. See Chaudhry & Kulkarni, supra note 24, at 780–81.
161. See Traders Phone Up Gambling Helplines, supra note 149 (“‘When you’re
reinforcing that activity, it starts to rewire a person’s brain, and translates to habit that for some
leads to addiction,’ Grondin said.”).
162. Gunjan Banerji, Individuals Embrace Options Trading, Turbocharging Stock
Markets, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/individuals-embraceoptions-trading-turbocharging-stock-markets-11632661201 [https://perma.cc/F6H8-H9JU].
163. Popper, supra note 71.
164. See Investors Are Using Robinhood to Jump into Options Trades, supra note 109.
165. See Osipovich & Banerji, supra note 110 (“Some warn that larger order-flow
payments from options activity can effectively push inexperienced customers into risky trades
they don’t understand, exposing them to large potential losses.”).
166. Administrative Complaint, supra note 17, at 18.
167. Cherdack, supra note 115, at 162.
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Robinhood often allows customers to trade options even if they attested
they had no investment experience, had a low risk appetite, or both.168
These allegations were mirrored by an enforcement action against
Robinhood by the FINRA, a self-regulatory organization that oversees
broker-dealers.
FINRA also found that Robinhood had minimal requirements for
allowing its customers to trade options, requiring only minimal selfattestations with no attempt at confirmation, and then often failed to
enforce these minimal requirements.169 As a result, young customers with
no investment experience, including even teenagers, were allowed to start
trading options.170 Robinhood had to pay $70 million to settle the action,
the largest amount ever assessed by FINRA.171
However, this extraordinarily high level of options trading is not just
because Robinhood makes it easier. It is also because Robinhood’s app is
designed to prompt its customers to trade options more often:
It’s not difficult to buy broadly diversified exchange-traded index
funds on Robinhood, but for a new user the app’s homepage focuses
attention on individual stocks and cryptocurrencies. As on some but
not all rival broker apps, stock and Bitcoin prices pop out visually
because they’re updated by the moment. There’s also a big button on
each trading page offering the choice to use options . . . . “Unlock
More Potential,” the app says to users on the options sign-up page.172

This trading behavior, encouraged by Robinhood’s design, is
extraordinarily lucrative for Robinhood, which earned over $700 million
in revenue from PFOF in 2020, and earned $1.4 billion in 2021.173 Much
of this comes from high-risk options trades. For example, PFOF from its
customers’ options trades made up nearly forty percent of Robinhood’s
total revenue, and nearly half of its PFOF revenue, in 2021.174
While it is clear that this is highly profitable for Robinhood, how do
Robinhood’s customers fare? In a word, poorly. It has been known for
decades that frequent trading is generally bad for retail investors,175 with
168. See Administrative Complaint, supra note 17, at 18.
169. FINRA LETTER, supra note 16.
170. Id. at 20.
171. FINRA Press Release, FINRA Orders Record Financial Penalties Against
Robinhood
Financial
LLC
(June
30,
2021),
https://www.finra.org/mediacenter/newsreleases/2021/finra-orders-record-financial-penalties-against-robinhood-financial
[https://perma.cc/Q3PG-EKX2].
172. Egkolfopoulou et al., supra note 57 (emphasis added).
173. ROBINHOOD MARKETS, INC. FORM 10-K, supra note 112, at 92.
174. Robinhood Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2021 Results, ROBINHOOD (Jan.
27,
2022),
https://investors.robinhood.com/news/news-details/2022/Robinhood-ReportsFourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year-2021-Results/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/59EX-UHTN].
175. Bob Pisani, Attention Robinhood Power Users: Most Day Traders Lose Money,
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frequent traders underperforming the market by around 6.5%, compared
to 1.5% for buy and hold investors.176 This holds for Robinhood
customers, who specifically suffer disproportionate losses as a direct
result of engaging in broadly suboptimal trading strategies, such as
frequent trading and overreacting in response to market news177—which
they are induced to do by the predatory DEPs on the platform. Likewise,
multiple studies have shown that retail investors perform more poorly the
more options they trade,178 with one study concluding that “most investors
incur substantial losses on their options investments, which are much
larger than the losses from equity trading.”179
We should also not forget that behind all these numbers in academic
studies demonstrating how Robinhood leads its customers to financial
losses are real human beings who suffer real hardship that goes beyond
dollars and cents and can be devastating, as has been documented in
several news accounts.
For example, the recent HBO Max documentary “Gaming Wall
Street” had a number of stories of GameStop traders that were poignant if
not heartbreaking.180 One trader referred to himself as “upper middle class
homeless” as he got online in his car in a parking lot where he could find
free Wi-Fi.181
Additionally, a testimonial from an anonymous Robinhood customer
published in Vice details how that customer lost $400,000, nearly
everything they had, on a single options bet.182 As he relayed to Vice, this
Robinhood customer was relatively conservative when it came to finance,
rarely splurging on big ticket items, as evidenced by the fact he was
apparently able to save up several hundred thousand dollars by the age of
twenty-six despite having come from relatively modest financial

CNBC (Nov. 20, 2020, 10:04 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/20/attention-robinhoodpower-users-most-day-traders-lose-money.html [https://perma.cc/33SH-TQDE].
176. Chaudhry & Kulkarni, supra note 24, at 780–81.
177. Barber et al., supra note 148.
178. See Yubin Li et al., Trading Behavior of Retail Investors in Derivatives Markets:
Evidence from Mini Options, 133 J. BANKING & FIN. 106250, 106250 (2021),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426621002090
[https://perma.cc/CYG4-DUQK].
179. Rob Bauer et al., Option Trading and Individual Investor Performance, 33 J.
BANKING
&
FIN.
731,
731
(2008),
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.464.1022&rep=rep1&type=pdf
[https://perma.cc/TRF6-GNJW]
(emphasis added).
180. See GAMING WALL STREET, supra note 1.
181. Id.
182. Anonymous as told to Maxwell Strachan, I Lost $400,000, Almost Everything I Had,
on
a
Single
Robinhood
Bet,
VICE
(Dec.
2,
2021,
9:00
AM),
https://www.vice.com/en/article/bvnn3a/i-lost-dollar400000-almost-everything-i-had-on-asingle-robinhood-bet [https://perma.cc/UCQ5-YT9W].
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circumstances.183
This conservatism extended to investments.184
However, after seeing the GameStop frenzy, and suffering from a case of
FOMO (fear of missing out), this customer bought $5,000 worth of AMC
stock which “became $15,000 when I bet on something else, then it
became $50,000 when I bet on silver.”185 Satisfied with this profit, the
customer sought out a “safe bet,” and for this “safe bet” settled on
investing $300,000, to later be followed with an additional $100,000 “on
this one single stock option: The $200 strike price call option on
Alibaba.”186
Of course, nothing about going “all in” on a single stock could ever
be considered a “safe bet,” particularly when using an option contract that
utilizes leverage. Unsurprisingly, within a short period of time, the
$400,000 this self-described “financially conservative” customer had
invested in what he thought was a “safe bet” turned to zero.187 The story
is remarkable because it demonstrates how easily less-experienced
customers of game-like trading platforms such as Robinhood can suffer
devastating financial consequences without ever even fully realizing that
such results are even possible. While this customer acknowledged his
own role in the losses he suffered, he also had choice words for how
Robinhood’s design can lead customers to potential financial ruin:
The way it’s designed, you get dopamine hits. When you place a trade,
when you see it go up or down, the green or the red, it’s addictive. If
their model is [PFOF], there’s no question they just want you to trade,
no matter if you win or lose money.188

There are several other similarly devastating stories of Robinhood
customers suffering severe financial hardship because they do not fully
grasp the potential risks of the trading activity Robinhood encourages. An
April 2021 Wall Street Journal story illustrates how damaging platforms
like Robinhood can be to the lives of their customers. It tells the story of
three friends and amateur investors as they became more heavily engaged
in day trading on Robinhood.189 Some early success, combined with the
DEPs of the app—one of the friends explicitly compared the feeling of
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. Other Robinhood users have voiced similar sentiments. One Robinhood user
and blogger, after learning of the tragic death by suicide of Alex Kearns, stated, “Checking back
in on [Robinhood], the financial details placed forefront for companies are childish and
uninformative to any legitimate investor. This is not a broker anymore.” Knipfer, supra note
117.
189. Rachel Louise Ensign, Robinhood, Three Friends and the Fortune that Got Away,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2021, 9:56 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/robinhood-three-friendsand-the-fortune-that-got-away-11619099755 [https://perma.cc/2FGL-KDKR].
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seeing your Robinhood account going up to the “rush” you feel when
doing well in a video game like Call of Duty—resulted in each of the
friends taking on increasingly larger risks on Robinhood.190 This included
trading on margin—i.e., using borrowed money to make trades. Margin
trading can amplify gains but is high risk because it can also lead to
devastating losses that are many times the initial investment, which is why
it is not a suitable strategy for less-experienced investors or those without
a lot of money to lose. Nevertheless, the three friends found that signing
up for a margin account on Robinhood was remarkably easy, even though
none of the friends fully understood how trading on margin worked or
how it ramped up their risk. Indeed, when one friend recommended to
another that he should begin trading on margin, the second friend
responded, “Yeah, and no idea [what the hell] that is.”191
Eventually, the excessive trading and risk-taking took their toll on
these three friends. They even once joked about buying matching
Lamborghinis, but their good humor faded as their losses piled up. The
friend who fared best had once had an account value of $23,000, but lost
almost all of that, ending up with just a $700 gain on top of an initial
investment of $4,500.192 The other two friends featured in the article lost
a third of their initial investment.193 One of the friends experienced a loss
of $50,000 on a single trade, which led to a significant amount of
despair.194
Yet another heartbreaking story about a Robinhood customer was
featured in a July 2020 New York Times article. That article tells the story
of a thirty-two-year-old Navy medic who had previously “dabbled
infrequently in stock trading.”195 This changed once he signed up for
Robinhood and was “charmed” by its “one-click trading, easy access to
complex investment products, and features like falling confetti and emojifilled phone notifications that made it feel like a game.”196 However, like
many Robinhood customers, he quickly found out that investing was
much more serious than the fun and easy design of Robinhood had
indicated—he funded his account with $15,000 in credit-card-cash
advances, and then later took out a total of $60,000 in home equity loans
to cover his losses.197 In March 2018, when Robinhood suffered a series

190. Id.
191. Id. (“[Robinhood] prominently features a metric called ‘buying power’ that includes
margin. But they had a hard time finding any similar disclosure of what they might owe if their
bets on stocks soured and triggered margin calls.”).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Popper, supra note 71.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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of outages, he suffered losses of nearly a million dollars.198 Ultimately,
his Robinhood account value sat at $6,956 as of the date the article was
published—less than half the $15,000 he put in initially using highinterest credit-card-cash advances.199
The most tragic illustration of the destructive harm wrought by
Robinhood’s use of predatory DEPs to get its less-experienced customers
to take on enormous risk is the heartbreaking story of Alex Kearns.200 Mr.
Kearns was a college student whom Robinhood allowed to trade options.
Mr. Kearns, at twenty years old, had less experience in trading, and did
not understand how much money he stood to lose by trading options.201
In fact, in his suicide note he stated, “I also ha[d] no clue what I was
doing.”202
His inexperience was exacerbated by Robinhood’s confusing design,
which led him to believe he could not trade on margin—understandable
since he had turned margin trading off, not realizing that his options trades
still required the use of margin.203 Mr. Kearns’s risky options trades
resulted in massive losses, and he received an unexpected margin call
from Robinhood for $178,000, and was led to believe he had lost more
than $730,000 when he had thought he could lose no more than

198. Id.
199. Id. That this user funded his investment account in part with credit-card cash
underscores the financial inexperience of some Robinhood users: credit-card-cash advances
typically come with extraordinarily high interest rates (often higher than the already-high
standard rate for purchases) and fees, which makes turning a profit extraordinarily difficult, if
not impossible. E.g., Louis DeNicola, Can You Buy Stocks with a Credit Card, EXPERIAN (May
30, 2021), https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/can-you-buy-stocks-with-a-creditcard/ [https://perma.cc/PCR6-MU7K].
200. See Levintova, supra note 8.
201. Peter Rudegeair, Robinhood Faces Wrongful-Death Lawsuit over Young Trader’s
Suicide, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/robinhood-faces-wrongfuldeath-lawsuit-over-young-traders-suicide-11612813320?mod=article_inline
[https://perma.cc/FH4L-SQH8]; see also Complaint at 2, 11, Kearns v. Robinhood Fin. LLC,
No. 21-cv-375872 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.courthousenews.com/wpcontent/uploads/2021/02/robinhood-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8M9R-EKFG]. The lawsuit has
since been settled. Sarah Jackson, Robinhood Has Settled a Lawsuit Over the Death of a 20Year-Old Who Died by Suicide Last Year Thinking He Lost $730,000 on the Stock-Trading App,
INSIDER (July 1, 2021, 5:59 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/robinhood-settled-suitsuicide-20-year-old-trader-alex-kearns-2021-7 [https://perma.cc/68VP-SBKJ].
202. Mother Jones, supra note 20, at 02:15; see also Helenowski & Levintova, supra note
5.
203. Id.; FINRA LETTER, supra note 16, at 3; see also Tony Dokoupil et al., Alex Kearns
Died Thinking He Owed Hundreds of Thousands for Stock Market Losses on Robinhood. His
Parents Have Sued over His Suicide, CBS NEWS (Feb. 8, 2021, 2:03 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/alex-kearns-robinhood-trader-suicide-wrongful-death-suit/
[https://perma.cc/79QN-RHL2].
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$10,000.204
After “increasingly desperate” attempts to reach Robinhood customer
service, Mr. Kearns “thinking that he was saving his family from financial
ruin,” took “a screenshot of his Robinhood balance, and got on his bike.
He rode through his hometown . . . eventually stopping at a secluded
railroad crossing,” and “he threw himself in front of an oncoming train.”205
Having opened his Robinhood account when he was a senior in high
school,206 Mr. Kearns tragically died by suicide at the age of twenty.207
This is definitely not the legendary Robin Hood fighting for the little
guy, and not how you democratize finance. This is how you mislead,
manipulate, and exploit young and less-experienced people (he “got on
his bike!”) to enrich yourself at their expense. Mr. Kearns may be the
most extreme example of harm from Robinhood’s use of predatory DEPs
on its platform,208 but there is still significant harm inflicted on many of
Robinhood’s customers.
F. Robinhood Is Not “Democratizing Finance.” It Is Exploiting Its
Less-experienced Customers for the Benefit of Itself and Entrenched
and Powerful Wall Street Interests
The extent of the harm Robinhood customers suffer from using its
platform in the way it is apparently designed and presumably intended for
them to use raises questions about what “democratizing finance” means.
According to Robinhood’s CEO, this means “open[ing] up investing to a
younger and more diverse group of Americans,” particularly younger
Americans with less money to invest, and who are less experienced in the
stock market.209 But this cannot be enough to constitute “democratizing”
finance. After all, payday lenders provide “access” to loans for Americans
who do not have a lot of money, and hardly anyone would consider payday
lenders to be “democratizing lending,” particularly because payday
lenders trap their customers in an endless cycle of debt.210
204. Rudegeair, supra note 201.
Robinhood displayed his account balance
as -$730,165.72; it was in fact -$365,530.60—further underscoring that Robinhood’s platform
is far less user-friendly and intuitive than it claims. See FINRA LETTER, supra note 16.
205. Levintova, supra note 8.
206. Id.
207. Rudegeair, supra note 201.
208. Helenowski & Levintova, supra note 5 (“Following Kearns’ suicide—and a few
fines and investigations—Robinhood has made some changes to its design. It removed confetti
from the app earlier this year, along with other design features that evoked gambling or games
of chance, like scratch-off tickets.”); see also Caitlin McCabe, Robinhood to Remove
Controversial Digital Confetti from Trading App, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2021, 7:11 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/robinhood-to-remove-controversial-digital-confetti-fromtrading-app-11617195612 [https://perma.cc/G7NL-TPUB].
209. Tenev Testimony, supra note 139, at 4.
210. Ending Debt Traps in the Payday and Small Dollar Credit Industry: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Fin. Insts. of the H. Fin. Servs. Comm. 116th Cong. 5–7
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Robinhood’s marketing pitch, which begins with its name and logo,
conjures up the idea that there are easy riches to be had in the stock market
if only there was a selfless Robin Hood to help everyday investors take
from the rich Wall Street insiders and give to the poor Main Street
outsiders who are supposedly locked out of investing.211 The claim is that
those riches are inaccessible to everyday Americans largely due to lack of
ability to buy and sell stocks and options with the swipe of a finger on a
phone app and at no apparent upfront cost.212
However, investors are extremely unlikely to make money by
engaging in the risky, frequent, speculative trading that Robinhood
encourages for its retail customers,213 especially given that Robinhood
specifically “targets younger individuals who are more likely to have little
to no investment experience” and who are “less likely to be financially
literate.”214 This is because the stock trading industry is by and large
populated by very wealthy, highly sophisticated, professional traders and
investors, many of whom have advanced degrees in complex fields such
as math and computer science, and who, on top of that, also get the benefit
of using the most advanced technology money can buy. Those already
decided advantages are multiplied by those traders also having an
unmatched informational advantage from “seeing” in real time the flows
from multiple markets and not just on and off exchange trading venues,
but also the cash, futures, swaps, physical, and related markets.215 This is
(2019),
https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-116-ba15-wstate-petersonc20190430.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WQX-W86S] (testimony of Christopher L. Peterson)
(explaining that payday lenders “intentionally design their business models to keep low- and
moderate-income consumers trapped in debt”); see also Better Mkts. Inc., Comment Letter on
Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, Docket No. CFPB-2019-0006,
RIN 3170-AA80, 84 Fed. Reg. 4252 (May 15, 2019), https://www.bettermarkets.org/
sites/default/files/Better%20Markets%20CL%20CFPB%20Payday%20Underwriting%20Resc
ission%205-15-2019_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VFP-W6ZK] (explaining that payday lenders
create a “financial prison . . . by trapping consumers in never-ending cycles of unaffordable
debt”).
211. Note also how Robinhood conflates investing with trading as if they are synonymous
when they are decidedly not. Robinhood is clearly a trading platform, not an investing platform,
which is a consequence of its decision to get the vast majority of its revenue from PFOF which
only increasingly “flows” if Robinhood’s customers trade more and more.
212. Welcome to the New Wall Street, ROBINHOOD (July 29, 2021),
https://blog.robinhood.com/news/2021/7/29/welcome-to-the-new-wall-street
[https://perma.cc/JD8H-VE3L] (“The new Wall Street lives on Main Street, and it’s a place for
everyone—not just men in suits or big financial institutions.”).
213. Pisani, supra note 175.
214. Professor Bogan Testimony, supra note 58, at 3.
215. Ironically, that advantage now often includes “signal” information “scraped” from
social media sites, including r/wallstreetbets, other Reddit forums like r/SuperStonk, Twitter,
TikTok, and elsewhere. Lionel Laurent, Laughing at Matt Damon, and Other Meme-Stock
Metrics, BLOOMBERG: QUINT (Jan. 5, 2022, 12:54 AM), https://www.bloombergquint.com/
gadfly/laughing-at-matt-damon-on-reddit-twitter-and-other-crypto-meme-stock-metrics
[https://perma.cc/3VFR-CHR6]; see also Caitlin Ostroff & Paul Vigna, Wall Street Is Looking
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who Robinhood’s new Main Street traders are up against when
“accessing” the stock market. It is beyond reasonable doubt that the vast
majority of retail investors, no matter how smart or how much research
they do, cannot compete against those financial professionals.
That is why retail traders consistently significantly underperform the
market. Robinhood does not offer its customers anything that makes up
for this extreme disparity in resources and real-time relevant information
that might help level the playing field. It simply allows them to easily get
onto a playing field that is already decidedly tilted against them where
they will almost certainly be repeatedly bested by longtime, professional
players with superior resources. Making that worse, Robinhood then
encourages them to engage in trading as often and riskily as possible and
calls that “democratization.” It is like saying anyone familiar with water
can compete in a high diving competition even though some do not know
how to swim—much less have diving experience—and others are deeply
experienced Olympic gold medal winners in high diving. Sure, they can
both jump off the diving board, but the outcomes are going to be vastly
different.
Truly democratizing finance must mean more than simply reducing
the apparent costs and other barriers to entry for stock trading, and
certainly must mean more than making it a “delightful” or fun experience.
As one study demonstrated, as online platforms for stock trading reduced
the visible transaction costs, the result for those who switched from
traditional trading platforms to online trading was to cause “these
participants [to] trade more actively, more speculatively, and less
profitably than before.”216 Thus, such limited democratizing changes (if
they can even fairly be called that) appear to only make it easier for the
Robinhoods of the world to enable their customers to enter a competition
against much better equipped players, which accordingly means it is an
unfair competition that those customers are likely to lose. Enabling its
relatively young and less-experienced customers to lose money trading in
the stock market more easily, for Robinhood’s benefit, is not
democratization.
Genuine democratization of finance should focus primarily on
helping Americans use the financial system to reach specific achievable
outcomes, such as wealth accumulation, saving for specific goals like
buying a house or retirement, or building a nest egg for emergencies.
Democratization also would focus on demystifying the financial system
so that more Americans understand how it works and have a clearer idea
to Reddit for Investment Advice, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 27, 2021, 2:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/wall-street-is-looking-to-reddit-for-investment-advice-11630056648
[https://perma.cc/82U7-8A29].
216. See Vicki L. Bogan, Household Investment Decisions, in INVESTOR BEHAVIOR: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF FINANCIAL PLANNING AND INVESTING 83, 86 (H. Kent Baker & Victor
Ricciardi eds., 2014) (emphasis added).
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of the risks associated with their various financial options, and, most
importantly, to assist them with making truly informed decisions tailored
to their particular circumstances. Genuine democratization would not just
focus on providing supposedly “easy” access to the markets (without
making clear how those markets work, or the risks involved in entering
those markets), or the customer experience (which, enjoyable as it may
be, has little to do with whether someone makes or loses money). Put
differently, rather than focus on the process of accessing markets and the
experience of customers, real democratization would focus on positive
trading and investing outcomes for a broader set of Americans.
Ultimately, democratization means making it easier for Main Street
Americans to actually make money in the stock market, which is possible
for retail investors, but unlikely if they engage in the frequent trading
strategy Robinhood and other platforms that use predatory DEPs
encourage. Rather, for most individual retail investors, using the stock
market to make money and achieve realistic, but ambitious, financial goals
typically means foregoing the often frequent attempt (and, yes,
excitement) of making a quick buck, and instead opting for a longer-term
buy-and-hold strategy that allows customers to take advantage of
compound returns to increase their wealth. Put differently, it would
enable and encourage customers to think of themselves as investors, not
merely traders.
In other words, truly democratizing finance means making stock
trading and investing a wealth-creation system, not a wealth-extraction
mechanism. That means making it easier to use the stock market as a longterm savings and investment vehicle to build wealth, not as a slot machine
that makes glitzy promises of a big payoff but is in fact more likely to
drain your bank account, leaving you worse off than when you started.
Importantly, encouraging customers to engage in non-exploitative
investment strategies does not require abandonment of DEPs, which can
be used to nudge customers towards investing and saving behavior that
will be profitable for themselves just as easily as they can be used to nudge
customers towards trading behavior that will be profitable for the
platform.217 For example, Fidelity (which does not accept PFOF),218
explained in its response to the SEC’s request for information (RFI) on
DEPs that it uses DEPs to allow its customers “to explore, for example,
217. See Chaudhry & Kulkarni, supra note 24 (identifying a set of “best practices” to
apply when designing a trading platform that would encourage more deliberative and less
impulsive trading); Julie Jargon, Investing, Not Gambling: These Apps and Services Help Young
Stock
Buyers
Think
Long
Term,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Mar.
13,
2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/investing-not-gambling-these-apps-and-services-help-youngstock-buyers-think-long-term-11615644000?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=1
[https://perma.cc/SW9Z-YWAA].
218. Commitment to Execution Quality, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/
trading/execution-quality/overview [https://perma.cc/VX9U-CJAD].
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asset allocation strategies, diversification, and goal-based planning.”219
Similarly, according to its response to the RFI, Wealthfront (which also
does not accept PFOF)220 uses DEPs to, among other things, “inform
clients if their actions are inconsistent with their financial objectives and
risk tolerance.”221
Assuming these DEPs are based on an assessment of customers’
investment objectives and financial situation, these would seem to be the
sorts of uses of DEPs that could be fairly said to democratize finance
(without in any way endorsing those particular platforms or DEPs). Nor
does encouraging prudent, long-term investment and saving strategies
mean abandoning “fun” and “engaging” features. Confetti and other
celebratory graphics for making trades are not problematic DEPs because
they make customers feel good, but celebratory graphics for trading
subliminally stimulate and give positive reinforcement to an action that
will end up being detrimental to customers—a bit like giving someone a
pat on the back for each puff of a cigarette.222 By contrast, Wealthfront
uses confetti graphics to celebrate when users deposit more money into
their investment account, an action that is more likely to lead to long-term
financial health—a bit like giving someone an encouraging pat on the
back for completing each mile when running a marathon.223 Similarly, a
DEP could provide confetti, balloons, or other types of psychic rewards
when the securities in their account appreciated in value and, therefore,
their wealth increased. This would be a reward for a buy-and-hold, longterm strategy, rather than inducing a short-term, likely losing, trading
strategy.
Instead, what Robinhood offers is a bit like sending a part-time, local
recreational baseball team onto a field to play the 2021 World Series
Champion Atlanta Braves. The local team may be filled with players who
are better, much better even, than the average person is at baseball. At the
same time, Atlanta’s players are each among the very best at baseball in
the world. That is not only because they have talent, but because they also
have access to the best equipment, the best coaches, the best training
techniques, the best analytical tools, and much more. And Atlanta’s
219. Fidelity Invs., Comment Letter on Digital Engagement Practices 6 (Oct. 1, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-21/s71021-9315880-260065.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QMX6-GP3W].
220. Andy Rachleff, The Silent Assassin of Fees, WEALTHFRONT BLOG (July 26, 2017),
https://blog.wealthfront.com/silent-assassin-fees/ [https://perma.cc/299E-78V6].
221. Wealthfront Corp., Comment Letter on Digital Engagement Practices 3 (Oct. 8,
2021), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-21/s71021-9332518-260240.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HH2T-9R4D].
222. Similarly, rewards can be highly predatory DEPs. See Mother Jones, supra note 20;
see also Helenowski & Levintova, supra note 5.
223. Wealthfront Corp., Comment Letter on Digital Engagement Practices 5 (Oct. 8,
2021), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-21/s71021-9332518-260240.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HH2T-9R4D].
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players are professionals with many years of highly specialized training.
They and their sophisticated support teams spend most of their waking
hours dedicated to getting better at baseball.
None of that is the case for the players on the local recreational
baseball team. The players on the local team playing the World
Champions may manage to get on base a few times, or even get a hit, but
there is no doubt who is going to win the game, almost certainly by a large
margin. Other than the occasional fluke,224 everyone knows that when
part-time hobbyists take on full-time professionals, professionals win.
Sending hobbyists to compete against professionals who are certain to win
is not “democratizing” anything; it simply tees up a preordained outcome:
professionals win and amateurs lose—regardless of the game.225
Robinhood’s marketing is analogous to telling this local recreational
team that the only thing they need to win against World Champions is to
get on the field. Robinhood creates and fuels an unrealistic expectation.
However, what Robinhood is doing is actually much worse because, at
least in baseball, once you get on the field and see the competition (the
World Champion Atlanta Braves team) it is readily apparent that merely
getting on the field likely has no relationship to success. In contrast,
everything Robinhood does with its platform is to disguise the
professional piranhas waiting to exploit its customers. Adding insult to
injury, Robinhood actually serves up its unsuspecting customers to those
professionals—the modern-day Bernie Madoffs—via PFOF. Given the
money at stake, this is not game.
Unlike baseball or other sports, Robinhood’s customers are not
224. See Jon Sarlin, ‘I Don’t Feel Like a Pro, but I’m Acting Like a Pro.’ These GameStop
Traders Struck Gold. Then Came the Hard Part, CNN: BUSINESS (Feb. 1, 2022, 11:37 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/01/investing/gamestop-meme-stock-anniversary/index.html
[https://perma.cc/2TJ9-Q5P6].
225. Many believe that the Reddit rebellion with GameStop is at least a partial
counterexample. They believe that they—the amateurs—had bested the market pros by
orchestrating a short squeeze on nefarious hedge funds like Melvin Capital. Those pros were
going to be driven into bankruptcy due to massive losses arising from covering their short
positions as the prices were skyrocketing due to the amateurs buying and/or holding (i.e., not
selling) no matter the price increase. Yet, just as the amateurs had the shorting hedge funds (the
pros) on the ropes, Robinhood and other retail brokers prohibited additional purchases
(“removed the buy button”) which caused the prices of the stocks to plummet and allowed the
pros to cover their short positions, reducing their losses and preventing their bankruptcies. Sure,
one high profile hedge fund, Melvin, lost a lot of money and needed a $2.8 billion bailout, see
supra note 13, but the pros got away with it and most of the amateurs were again bested,
although this time the rigging of the markets was blatant and visible even if, arguably, legal.
See, e.g., Spencer Jakab, Who Really Got Rich from the GameStop Revolution?, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 29, 2022, 12:18 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/who-really-got-rich-from-thegamestop-revolution-11643432418 [https://perma.cc/WU5P-9T57]. But see, Caitlin McCabe
& Alexander Osipovich, GameStop Investors Still Await Riches from Epic Short Squeeze, WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2022, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/gamestop-investors-still-awaitriches-from-epic-short-squeeze-11644066002 [https://perma.cc/33WX-SUHR].
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playing a game no matter how much the platforms are gamified, and they
are risking a lot more than a bruised ego. It is their hard-earned money
that is at stake. Robinhood, through its predatory use of DEPs, encourages
these customers to risk their money (often pegged for important life goals
such as paying down debt, buying a house, paying for the education of a
child, or retirement226) by engaging in trading strategies that are
suboptimal at best and disastrous, even deadly, at worst. Encouraging
less-experienced investors, without much money to lose, to more
frequently engage in a risky competition against professionals with vastly
superior resources, information, and abilities is not “democratization.” It
is predatory and manipulative, and is designed to allow Robinhood, and
its founders, who are now billionaires, to profit at its customers’
expense.227
Robinhood’s activities also help line the pockets of its real customers,
which are HFTs like Citadel Securities that pocket billions of dollars a
year from the lucrative retail order flow Robinhood and other brokers sell
them.228 As the reporter Hannah Levintova reminds us, “[t]he money
flows [of PFOF] evoke a key lesson of the digital age: If something is free,
then you’re not the customer—you’re the product being sold” to someone
else, in this case, the HFT firms like Citadel Securities.229
Anyone who doubts Robinhood’s incentives and focus need only read
the facts of the SEC enforcement action detailed above: The SEC found
that Robinhood solicited “unusually high” PFOF payments, even though
it knew this meant its customers would inevitably lose money from
inferior execution quality. Even worse, according to the SEC, Robinhood
undertook an analysis that confirmed that it was ripping off its customers
and kept right on ripping them off and deceiving them about it.230 It took
from its young, less-experienced customers, who mostly have fewer
resources to begin with, and gave to billionaire HFT firms and itself, with
its founders in turn becoming billionaires themselves.231
226. Ensign, supra note 189 (“Mr. Norkin wanted to buy a house and build his retirement
fund after years of pouring money into his business. Mr. Garcia was expecting his first child
and considered opening a Roth IRA for her. Mr. Ela planned to pay off his student loans and
credit-card debt he accumulated while in college.”).
227. Anders Melin, Robinhood Duo Ride Trading Frenzy to Billionaire Riches,
BLOOMBERG WEALTH (July 29, 2021, 7:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2021-07-29/robinhood-duo-ride-retail-trading-frenzy-to-billionaireriches?sref=mtQ4hc2k [https://perma.cc/X6B6-CMPE].
228. Alex Kirshner, What Everyone Who’s Mad at Robinhood Got Wrong, SLATE (Feb.
3, 2021, 12:45 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2021/02/robinhood-gamestop-stockbusiness-model.html [https://perma.cc/XN92-7JQL] (“Robinhood is a you-are-the-product
company.”).
229. Levintova, supra note 8.
230. See supra notes 92–98.
231. Melin, supra note 227. It is also worth noting that these self-proclaimed
democratizers of finance also structured Robinhood with two classes of stock to ensure they
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This conduct is practically the opposite of the Robin Hood imagery
Robinhood’s marketing attempts to portray, which begins with its
invocation of the legendary populist outlaw, who was famous for taking
from the rich and giving to the poor, not taking from the poor and giving
to himself and his rich friends. It makes one wonder whether the “Sheriff
of Nottingham” would be a more accurate name for “Robinhood” and
whether its ticker symbol should be “HOODLUM” rather than “HOOD.”
IV. THE SEC’S POTENTIAL RESPONSES TO ISSUES RAISED BY
DEPS
The risks that platforms like Robinhood and their predatory, PFOFfueled use of DEPs pose to investors are clear and obviously warrant
considered action by the SEC. Fortunately, the SEC under Chairman Gary
Gensler seems prepared to give careful thought to many of the issues
raised by the GameStop trading frenzy, including PFOF and DEPs. The
SEC also has existing tools it can use to address some of the issues raised
by PFOF and DEPs, including its recently promulgated Regulation Best
Interest (Reg. BI) which, although seriously flawed,232 at least provides
the SEC with a potential avenue for addressing some of the harmful
conflicts of interest that exist between Robinhood and its customers.
Ultimately, whatever the SEC does do to address the issues raised by the
meme stock frenzy, it must be focused on protecting investors, not
predatory business models.
A. Revisiting the Regulation of PFOF
As explained above, PFOF is a longstanding practice that is crucial
to the relatively new business model of game-like trading platforms with
predatory DEPs such as Robinhood.
More specifically, PFOF
incentivizes platforms to design their apps with predatory DEPs that
induce precisely the sort of risky trading that too often leads to devastating
losses for retail investors. Whatever merit there may have been in the
SEC’s past decision not to meaningfully regulate PFOF, that decision
must be revisited given the development of trading platforms that make
would control the company, not the public shareholders: While co-founders Tenev and Bhatt
will each own 7.9% of Robinhood’s outstanding shares, they “will own all of Robinhood’s Class
B shares after the offering. Those shares have [ten] times as much voting power as Class A
shares” giving Tenev and Bhatt sixty-five percent control of voting power. Ari Levy Fintech
Keeps Minting Billionaires as Robinhood Co-Founders Prepare for Massive IPO, CNBC (July
19, 2021, 6:02 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/19/robinhood-founders-to-be-worth-over5-billion-as-fintech-ipos-pile-up.html [https://perma.cc/K5GY-VZGV].
232. See Micah Hauptman & Stephen Hall, XY Planning Network, LLC v. SEC: Broker
Conflicts of Interest, Regulation “Best Interest,” and Investors’ False Sense of Security, THE
FINREG BLOG (Mar. 5, 2020), https://sites.law.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2020/03/05/xyplanning-network-llc-v-sec-broker-conflicts-of-interest-regulation-best-interest-and-investorsfalse-sense-of-security/ [https://perma.cc/963D-RLLU].
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predatory use of DEPs to induce harmful trading because of PFOF
incentives.
The SEC does appear to be poised to address both the old and new
concerns raised by PFOF. SEC Chairman Gensler has expressed
significant skepticism about the practice, recognizing correctly that the
practice carries with it an inherent conflict of interest, that it has fueled the
proliferation of harmful DEPs, and that the “commission-free” trading
enabled by PFOF is not free, but carries with it hidden costs.233
Accordingly, Chairman Gensler said he is open to any and all avenues to
address the various issues raised by PFOF, from requiring greater
disclosure about the practice and how it harms investors, to outright
banning the practice.234
The industry has predictably responded to this possibility with a fullcourt lobbying press235 predicting doom for the capital markets and retail
investors if PFOF is banned.236 Among other things, the industry’s
objections have resulted in at least one bill, authored by Senator Pat
Toomey (R-PA), that would prohibit the SEC from banning the
practice.237
Nevertheless, the SEC should give careful consideration to banning
PFOF, which has been done in jurisdictions including the United
233. Thomas Franck, SEC Chief Gensler Says Regulator Assessing Future of Payment
for Order Flow, CNBC (Oct. 19, 2021, 2:35 PM) [hereinafter SEC Chief Gensler],
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/19/sec-chief-gensler-says-regulator-assessing-payment-fororder-flow.html [https://perma.cc/9HCQ-5XGP].
234. See id.
235. See Miriam Rozen, Robinhood Tripled Prior Year’s Lobbying Spend in First Half
of 2021, ADVISORHUB (Aug. 17, 2021), https://www.advisorhub.com/robinhood-tripledprior-years-lobbying-spend-in-first-half-of-2021/ [https://perma.cc/C6EE-4A5K]; Theodoric
Meyer, Robinhood Builds a Presence on K Street, POLITICO (Aug. 14, 2020, 2:38 PM),
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-influence/2020/08/14/robinhood-builds-apresence-on-k-street-789942 [https://perma.cc/U3E8-NS67].
236. Alexander Osipovich, High-Speed Trader Virtu Fires Back at Critics Amid MemeStock Frenzy, WALL ST. J. (June 13, 2021) [hereinafter Virtu Fires Back],
https://www.wsj.com/articles/high-speed-trader-virtu-fires-back-at-critics-amid-meme-stockfrenzy-11623592801 [https://perma.cc/M8CS-L4RT] (“In an interview, Mr. Cifu warned that
banning the practice and requiring that individual investors’ orders be sent to exchanges would
harm small investors. ‘Retail investors would get a much, much worse experience,’ he told The
Wall Street Journal.”).
237. Wall Street Pushes Back, supra note 89; see also, Thomas Franck, GOP Senator
Toomey Debuts Bill to Protect Broker Revenues, Payment for Order Flow, CNBC (Oct. 28,
2021, 10:17 AM) [hereinafter GOP Senator Toomey], https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/28/gopsenator-toomey-debuts-bill-to-protect-payment-for-order-flow.html [https://perma.cc/TMR2BPT6] (“‘New innovations—such as zero-commission trading and user-friendly mobile apps—
have allowed more Americans to participate in the stock market than ever before,’ Toomey, the
ranking member on the Senate Banking Committee, said in a press release.”); Eleanor Terrett
& Charles Gasparino, Robinhood Gets Boost as Congress Declines Ban—for Now—on Sales
Tactic, FOX BUS. (Aug. 15, 2021), https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/robinhood-boostcongress-declines-ban-pfof-sales-tactic [https://perma.cc/M78K-DWR9].
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Kingdom, Canada, and Australia,238 and has, unsurprisingly, not resulted
in harm to those markets or retail investors in those countries.239 In fact,
a 2016 report by CFA Institute, a global association of industry
professionals, found that after the United Kingdom banned PFOF, there
was “an increase in the proportion of retail-sized trades executing at best
quoted prices between 2010 and 2014 from [sixty-five percent] to more
than [ninety percent].”240 In other words, banning PFOF resulted in a
significant improvement in execution quality for retail orders, a
development that is “a positive one for market integrity because it implies
that displayed liquidity providers are rewarded with executions at the price
they quote.”241 The same can be expected here, as suggested by the recent
study by the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets, which found that
customer orders routed to venues that paid for those orders received price
improvement, at most, eight percent of the time.242 Put differently, ninetytwo percent of the time customers will benefit by the elimination of PFOF.
Another option for mitigating the inherent conflict between PFOF
and the best execution requirement would be to have a definition of “best
execution” that is more strictly focused on the best price available at the
time of the trade,243 rather than using the misleadingly incomplete NBBO
or the confusing and subjective multi-factor test that is currently used to
assess compliance with the “best execution” requirement. It is past time
to end the misleading if not fraudulent claim of “price improvement.”
238. Mark Kolakowski, SEC Considers Banning Payment for Order Flow,
INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 22, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/sec-considers-banningpayment-for-order-flow-5199447 [https://perma.cc/SUU5-53GH].
239. Wall Street Pushes Back, supra note 89.
240. SVIATOSLAV ROSOV, CFA INST., PAYMENT FOR ORDER FLOW IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM 1 (2016), https://www.cfainstitute.org/-/media/documents/article/position-paper/
payment-for-order-flow-united-kingdom.ashx [https://perma.cc/4PRM-KJE7].
241. Id. at 2. To be clear, calling for enhanced regulation to address the harms caused by
PFOF (including its elimination) is not the same as suggesting that those responsible for
executing trades for investors should not be able to make a profit for those services. Whether it
is via commission, capturing the spread, other revenue streams or other business models, those
who facilitate execution of trades certainly deserve fair compensation. However, any and all
such compensation (in whatever direct or indirect form) should be clear, expressly stated, and
fully disclosed upfront to investors. Moreover, it should not contribute to conflicts of interests
between brokers and their clients, should not needlessly fragment markets, should not result in
darker and/or off exchange trading, should not be anti-competitive or create barriers to entry,
and should not encourage more trading for the sake of more trading. Such a tradingcompensation system should maximize liquidity, reduce spreads, benefit investors, make capital
raising less costly for businesses, and otherwise facilitate capital formation and allocation.
242. See Stafford, supra note 98; see also The PFOF Defenders, THEMIS TRADING LLC:
BLOG
(Mar.
2,
2022),
https://blog.themistrading.com/2022/03/the-pfof-defenders/
[https://perma.cc/CG62-MKBS] (reproducing two charts from Nasdaq showing “that spreads
have actually been widening during the zero-commission era”).
243. Better Markets has made this suggestion. See Kelleher Testimony, supra note 47,
at 21 (urging Congress and regulators to consider whether to replace the multi-factor best
execution standard with “a standard more strictly focused on pricing”).
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B. Addressing DEPs
The SEC also appears on its way to addressing the use of DEPs more
directly, with its opening salvo being an RFI about these practices.244 The
comments submitted to the SEC in response to the RFI largely broke down
along predictable lines. The industry, including platforms like Robinhood
that benefit from predatory DEPs, insisted that these features provide
customers with a variety of benefits, but ignored evidence of harm
associated with the PFOF-fueled use of DEPs by trading platforms.
Robinhood’s comment was illustrative of this approach. In its
comment, Robinhood argued strenuously that it provides the “have-nots”
with the benefits the “haves” enjoy.245 These benefits supposedly include
things like “receiv[ing] information from friends and colleagues
discussing the markets and finances over dinner, golf, or a cocktail party”
or “an investment professional who will answer questions, provide
explanations, and highlight relevant information.”246 Putting aside
whether Robinhood’s platform actually provides the equivalent of any of
these, this is simply a disingenuous representation of the advantages the
“haves” enjoy over Robinhood’s less-experienced customers.
Professional traders do not beat retail investors because of idle market
chatter on the back nine of a golf course. Rather, as explained above in
Section III.F, the advantages that the typical stock market professional
will have over the typical Robinhood customer are broad, deep, and
largely insurmountable: advanced degrees reflecting technical expertise in
relevant complex fields, such as mathematics and computer science; deep
knowledge of the markets gained over years or decades of trading
experience; the most advanced equipment money can buy that, among
other things, allows them to process enormous amounts of data quickly;
and real-time information on and visibility into multiple markets
simultaneously that they can use to maximize their profits, which come
from Robinhood’s customers. Push notifications about the latest earnings
reports and top-movers lists cannot possibly be expected to make up for
this enormous gulf, and it is absurd and misleading if not fraudulent to
suggest otherwise.
Robinhood also argued that stronger regulation of DEPs could
threaten its “user-friendly interface” that is “accessible” and “enjoyable”
for its customers.247 This builds off its CEO’s testimony before the House
244. Request for Information and Comments on Broker-Dealer and Investment Adviser
Digital Engagement Practices, Related Tools and Methods, and Regulatory Considerations and
Potential Approaches; Information and Comments on Investment Adviser Use of Technology
to Develop and Provide Investment Advice, 86 Fed. Reg. 49,067 (Sept. 1, 2021).
245. See generally Robinhood Fin., LLC, Comment Letter on Digital Engagement
Practices (Oct. 1, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-21/s71021-9316498260092.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4P9-HKXU].
246. ( Id. at 4.
247. ( Id. at 2, 12.
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Financial Services Committee, in which he insisted that Robinhood
provides its customers with the “intuitive experience customers want.”248
Robinhood may provide its customers “intuitive” experience that they
“expect” and “enjoy,”249 but that is or should be largely beside the point.
Such supposed “benefits” are fleeting and ephemeral and disappear the
second a customer (finally) logs off the platform. By contrast, the
financial disadvantages and losses that Robinhood’s customers
disproportionately suffer are real and lasting. This would be a bit like
arguing against regulating tobacco use because cigarette smokers enjoy
the act of smoking. An experience might be (temporarily) “delightful,”
but, if—like smoking—it kills you, that prior enjoyable experience is not
something to be promoted. Similarly, if an app facilitates being ripped off
of your hard-earned money (or worse, money you don’t have), whatever
delightfulness there was, is not worth it.
Actual investor advocates introduced evidence of the concrete harm
retail investors that use platforms like Robinhood suffer, and urged the
SEC to take strong action to address it.250 Examples of steps the SEC
could take to mitigate the risks posed by manipulative and predatory DEPs
include251:
(1) prohibiting describing no-commission trades as “commission-free
trading”;
(2) if platforms continue to be allowed to refer to “commission-free”
trading, requiring prominent disclosure of payments the platform
receives that enable that “commission-free” trading, and what costs
customers can expect to pay as a result of the preferential, PFOFinduced routing of orders to receive those kickbacks;
(3) regulating how platforms present market news and other
information to customers, so that it is less likely to lead to overreaction
and impulsive trading;
(4) requiring significantly more robust gatekeeping devices before
customers are allowed to engage in risky trading, such as frequent day
248. Tenev Testimony, supra note 39, at 6.
249. But see supra Section III.E.
250. See, e.g., Better Mkts., Comment Letter on Digital Engagement Practices (Oct. 1,
2021),
https://bettermarkets.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Better_Markets_Inc._
Comment_Letter_on_Digital_Engagement_Practices_RFI.pdf [https://perma.cc/C64H-266B];
N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, Comment Letter on Digital Engagement Practices (Oct. 1, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-21/s71021-9316149-260067.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LDR5-GSDF].
251. Of course, the SEC’s regulations should recognize, as we have explained in this
Article, that not all DEPs are harmful, and that not all ways investment platforms can use DEPs
are harmful. Ideally, any SEC rule addressing DEPs would promote the use of DEPs that
provide real, actual financial benefits to investors, while minimizing or eliminating the use of
predatory DEPs that lead investors to losses while benefiting platforms.
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trading and trading in options; and
(5) severely restricting, or eliminating, the predatory use of DEPs that
give positive reinforcement for engaging in risky investment practices.

C. Use Reg. BI to Address Conflicts Between Trading Platforms and
Customers
The SEC does already have tools at its disposal to mitigate some of
the risks DEPs pose to retail investors, including most prominently its
antifraud authority.252 Some also believe that one of these tools is Reg.
BI, which was promulgated by the SEC in 2019.253 That rule, while
significantly deficient in many respects,254 could provide the SEC with
some ability to address the inherent conflict of interest between what is
best for platforms like Robinhood, and what is best for their customers.255
Reg. BI applies whenever a broker makes “a recommendation of any
securities transaction or investment strategy involving securities
(including account recommendations) to a retail customer.”256 Thus, the
literal wording of Reg. BI extends beyond just recommending specific
stocks. And it is reasonable to conclude that some of the DEPs in use
today, alone or in combination, constitute “recommendations” within the
meaning of the rule, as they directly or indirectly steer investors into
intensive trading in securities (often specific securities), trading in groups
of securities, and trading through the use of various types of accounts.
In the adopting release to Reg. BI, the SEC also made clear that the
analysis of what constitutes a “recommendation” will be based on the facts
and circumstances, and is to be read broadly to include “recommendations
about types of accounts, such as day trading, margin, or option
accounts . . . regardless of whether or not they involve specific securities
transactions.”257 And SEC Commissioner Allison Lee in November 2021
explained that brokers need to start thinking seriously about which of their
252. See, e.g., Dennis Kelleher, Putting the SEC Cops Back on the Wall Street Beat, THE
HILL (May 3, 2021, 11:30 AM) [hereinafter SEC Cops], https://thehill.com/
opinion/finance/551408-putting-the-sec-cops-back-on-the-wall-street-beat
[https://perma.cc/X4J9-Q294]; Dennis Kelleher, It’s Time To Ramp Up Punishment for Wall
Street Wrongdoers, LAW360 (Feb. 16, 2021, 5:55 PM) [hereinafter Ramp Up Punishment],
https://www.law360.com/articles/1354083 [https://perma.cc/TL3A-D35A].
253. Regulation Best Interest, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,318 (July 12, 2019).
254. Hauptman & Hall, supra note 232.
255. Note, however, that the SEC’s Investor Advocate has questioned whether or not
Reg. BI can address these issues. Al Barbarino, ‘Gamification’ Exposes Major Reg BI Flaw,
SEC Official Says, LAW360 (Oct. 13, 2021, 4:37 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/1430578.
256. ( 17 C.F.R. § 240.151-1(a)(1) (2021).
257. Better Mkts., Comment Letter on Digital Engagement Practices 11 (Oct. 1, 2020),
https://bettermarkets.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Better_Markets_Inc._Comment_Letter_
on_Digital_Engagement_Practices_RFI.pdf [https://perma.cc/C64H-266B].
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practices constitute recommendations in the ever-evolving landscape of
broker-dealer interactions with their clients.258
D. Whatever Action It Takes, the SEC Must Focus on Protecting
Investors, Not Predatory Business Models
One of the primary reasons Reg. BI was so flawed from the
perspective of investor advocates is that the SEC during the Trump
administration prioritized protecting the broker-dealer business model
over protecting actual investors.259 Specifically, when adopting Reg. BI,
the SEC credited self-serving industry arguments that applying a robust
fiduciary standard to broker-dealers would threaten the broker business
model, which would in turn reduce “access” and “choice,”260 resulting in
258. Commissioner Allison Herren Lee, A Call to Action: Recommendations for
Complying with Reg BI Remarks at the ALI CLE 2021 Conference on Life Insurance Company
Products (Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/lee-complying-reg-bi-20211104
[https://perma.cc/WKR8-929F]. Robinhood and other platforms have strongly objected to any
attempt to characterize their DEPs as “recommendations” in their response to the SEC’s RFI.
Robinhood Fin., LLC, Comment Letter on Digital Engagement Practices (Oct. 1, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-21/s71021-9316498-260092.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M4P9-HKXU]. Nevertheless, it has warned its investors in public securities
filings of the very real possibility that it could be subject to Reg. BI, which would threaten its
business model. Robinhood Mkts., Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 45, 70 (July 1,
2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1783879/000162828021013318/robinhoods1.htm [https://perma.cc/GX6X-NAB5]. It is not entirely clear why Robinhood thinks Reg. BI
would be so harmful to its business model. Application of Reg. BI to Robinhood’s DEPs would
not make those DEPs illegal, it would mean those DEPs would be subject to Reg. BI’s
requirement to disclose and mitigate conflicts of interest and not place its own interest ahead of
its clients’. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15l-1(a)(1). Given that Robinhood claims that there are not any
relevant conflicts of interest between itself and its clients, Robinhood Fin., LLC, Comment
Letter on Digital Engagement Practices 5 (Oct. 1, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1021/s71021-9316498-260092.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4P9-HKXU] (“We do not believe there are
conflicts of interest associated with our web- and app-based customer engagement that require
additional regulatory action.”), and that its DEPs are clearly beneficial for its users, id. at 9
(“[M]any of our digital features are designed to promote financial literacy and investment
awareness and to provide customers with information they need and want in order to make
informed and self-directed decisions about their future investment goals and needs.”),
application of Reg. BI should pose little threat to Robinhood’s business. See Better Mkts.,
Comment Letter on Digital Engagement Practices 12–13 (Oct. 1, 2021),
https://bettermarkets.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Better_Markets_Inc._Comment_Letter_
on_Digital_Engagement_Practices_RFI.pdf [https://perma.cc/C64H-266B].
259. Better Mkts., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Regulation Best Interest 8–9 (Aug.
7, 2018), https://www.bettermarkets.org/sites/default/files/Better%20Markets%20Comment%
20Letter%20Reg%20BI%20%208-7-18%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9HP-HMZG].
260. “Access” and “choice” are, like “innovation,” buzzwords often employed by
industries trying to prevent strong regulations from being enacted. After all, who does not want
more access or choice? However, the self-serving invocation of these terms is often used to
mask the true harm to consumers and investors of products and practices that are profitable for
the industry. For example, payday loans were an “innovation” that provide consumers “access”
to loans and more “choices.” Yet quite obviously these products, which trap consumers in an
endless cycle of debt, are hardly beneficial for the people who take them out. See Better Mkts.
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consumer harm, even though little evidence was presented for such
arguments.261 Meanwhile the SEC ignored and downplayed actual
evidence of real, concrete harm suffered as a result of the widespread
broker conflicts of interest it failed to address.262
Whatever it does with regard to DEPs, PFOF, and other issues raised
by the GameStop trading frenzy, the SEC must not make this same
mistake. Already, industry participants are making dubious, evidencefree claims about the supposed “benefits” of PFOF and DEPs to retail
investors, all of which are abstract and/or fleeting,263 and the harm that
will befall investors if the SEC adopts strong rules. The SEC must not
credit these claims unless backed by strong, credible, and independent
evidence about real, concrete benefits retail investors gain from the status
quo that might be threatened if it adopts strong, protective rules.
CONCLUSION
It is an unfortunate reality that the stock market is an unlevel playing
field decidedly tilted against less-experienced retail investors. Those
investors who try to make money by frequent trading in equities and
options are going against professional experts with the best equipment and
market information, against whom they cannot fairly compete. They are
also competing in a needlessly fragmented marketplace—fragmentation
that is created and exploited by powerful HFTs like Citadel Securities to
profit even more at the expense of retail investors.
Trading platforms that use predatory DEPs claiming to make trading
“easy” and “enjoyable” do not level the playing field, but instead tilt it
even more against retail investors, who are seduced onto the field and set
up as easy marks. This makes it even easier for the likes of Robinhood
and Citadel to extract profits from them, while shamelessly claiming that
they are providing those retail investors with great benefits and execution.
Taking from less-experienced investors, with relatively little money to
lose, and giving to the likes of Robinhood’s founders and the billionaire
owners of Citadel cannot reasonably be considered the “democratization”
of finance. Such conduct is not just a misuse of the Robin Hood legend;
it is a perversion, if not a fraudulent practice or device. The SEC should
reject such self-serving and blatantly baseless claims, and meaningfully
regulate predatory DEPs and the PFOF kickbacks that incentivize
platforms to use them.
Inc., Comment Letter on Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans,
Docket No. CFPB-2019-0006, RIN 3170-AA80, 84 Fed. Reg. 4252 (May 15, 2019),
https://bettermarkets.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Better-Markets-CL-CFPB-PaydayUnderwriting-Rescission-5-15-2019_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VFP-W6ZK].
261. Hauptman & Hall, supra note 232.
262. Id.
263. See supra Section IV.B.
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